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ABSTRACT
The Emergence of Civil Disobedience Movements in Hong Kong
by
CHAN Kwun Hong
Master of Philosophy

Civil disobedience, as a specific means of protest, has drawn intellectual attention
worldwide, but few scholars in Hong Kong have studied this means of protest in
depth. Focusing on the reasons why civil disobedience movements have emerged in
Hong Kong, this research has used a case study methodology. Semi-structured
interviews have been conducted with people that participated in many of Hong
Kong’s previous civil disobedience movements, from the Yau Ma Tei Boat People
Incident of the 1970s, to the Anti-Public Order Ordinance demonstrations and
Citizens’ Radio Incident of the early 2000s. In addition to describing how the
emergence of specific civil disobedience movements happened, this research also
explores the sociopolitical conditions from which civil disobedience movements
have emerged in the Hong Kong context.
By interviewing key informants in each case (9 in total), a general pattern of the
emergence of civil disobedience in Hong Kong has been found. Departing from the
well-established studies on civil disobedience that have focused on the particular
ideologies of participants or specific characteristics of movement leaders, this study
contributes to the study of the sociopolitical conditions that led to emergence. All the
cases studied point to the fact that the employment of civil disobedience as a protest
means is a calculated response to delegitimizing effect, with the existence of civil
society.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: explaining the emergence of civil
disobedience movements in Hong Kong
1.1 Research Question
There are many ways to put our demands to our government. In a democratic
society, one can elect the head of the government, elect their representatives in the
legislative branch, or, when one has access to them, lobby the decision-makers. If
one cannot access power holders through institutional ways, one may protest or
demonstrate on the street to proclaim publicly what one wants. This is what
sociologists usually define as a social movement: “a collective attempt to further a
common interest, or secure a common goal, through collective action outside the
sphere of established institutions” (Giddens, 1989). But when will people choose to
violate the law, the decrees, the legal commands of police or regulations collectively
to further their common interests or goals?
When people deliberately protest the law or the policy of government by
violating it nonviolently, with the goal of changing the law or policy itself, the act is
regarded as civil disobedience.1 And this means can be employed collectively to be a
social movement. Civil disobedience movement must have been heard of by those
who have heard about Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. However,
except those philosophers and intellectuals who defined it and debated about it, the
concept is relatively vague to the ordinary citizen compared with other noninstitutional political acts like demonstrations, strikes - or, of course, elections which may be a part of their routine life.
1

There is disagreement about the definition of civil disobedience. The detail will be discussed in the
following part, which focuses on the nature of civil disobedience. Here, a relatively loose definition is
provided first.

1

In academic circles, topics related to civil disobedience have been well
discussed. The focus has ranged from the nature to the justification of the act.2
Despite the enormous, cross-discipline efforts made by scholars from philosophy,
political philosophy and legal theory, the contribution made by political scientists on
civil disobedience has not been that fruitful. So, this study aims at answering the
question “Why does civil disobedience movement emerge?” The question will be
approached by finding the sociopolitical conditions under which civil disobedience
has emerged, namely the necessary condition and sufficient condition. The necessary
condition will be first examined with the case of a student organization, the White
Rose, under a totalitarian regime (Nazi Germany). This case was chosen in order to
show that, even though the student organization was doing what philosophers may
count as civil disobedience, it was not, in fact, at all a significant one3 or hardly be
counted as a movement.
With reference to the history of India, the sufficient condition4 for emergence
of civil disobedience movement will be examined. Finally, the discussion on civil
disobedience movements in Hong Kong, with the support of interviews with
participants, will constitute the last part of the thesis, to testify that the necessary and
sufficient conditions have been found.

2

Also, the discussion on civil disobedience includes compatibility of the act and the constitutional
democracy, which will not be discussed in this thesis as they are not directly related to the focus.
3
The distinction between a significant and a not significant civil disobedience will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 2.
4
Here the author of this thesis would like to stress the sufficient condition found in the following
chapters cannot be tested separately. (e.g. whether AB, in other words, whether A condition can
cause B on itself) It is because practically speaking, event potentially undermining moral authority of
the regime cannot be turned into “Delegitimizing effect” (sufficient condition) if the civil society
(necessary condition) has not existed. There is a certain kind of relation between the two conditions.
So, the sufficient condition cannot be examined theoretically, in which necessary condition is nonexisting. More concrete discussion will be left in the specific chapter.

2

1.2 Literature Review
The contemporary study of civil disobedience was started by philosophers in
1961. A symposium named ‘Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience”, organized
by the American Philosophical Association, was “…perhaps the first occasion on
which the whole subject received formal attention from the academic community…”
(Bedau, 1991, p. 3). In his pioneering work On Civil Disobedience, Bedau (1961, p.
653) made his own attempt to define civil disobedience and offer possible
justifications - while he admitted that he was “…unable to find a suitably detailed
analysis…” at the time.
The founding definition provided by Bedau (1961, p. 661) was:
“Anyone commits an act of civil disobedience if and only if he acts illegally, publicly,
nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, policies, or decisions of
his government.”

Although the definition was controversial, Bedau had more or less made, what
the author of this thesis calls, the minimalist definition of the concept of civil
disobedience5. Also, he had provided the basic justification of the act. He claimed
that one’s obligation to follow the law was not solely and sufficiently justified by the
legal validity of the law. In other words, no one ever “…ought to do something just
because it is the law…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 662). So, this justification only provided a
right for one to act, it did not say that civil disobedience was always “…the right
thing to do…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 663). At the time, Bedau claimed that he did not see
a principle, which applied to all situations, that justified one’s obedience (or
disobedience) (Bedau, 1961, p. 663).

“Minimalist definition” will be used later in chapter 4 and 5 in the discussion of the Yau Ma Tei
Boat-People Incident in 1979.
5

3

When one traces back the develolpment of the field, one may discover that the
trends in topics for discussion are largely confined to two problems; the nature of
civil disobedience and its justification.

4

1.2.1 Nature of Civil Disobedience
On the nature of civil disobedience, the discussion includes the purpose and the
components. As we can see from the above definition made by Hugo A. Bedau in
1961, the purpose of disobedience is to “…frustrate (one of ) the laws, policies, or
decisions of his government”
However, as Bedau highlighted in 1991, civil disobedience “…must be viewed
as an exercise in public moral education, as a tactic to achieve law reform…” (Bedau,
1991, p. 7). The public moral education can be understood with reference to the
following:
“… by making an appeal to conscience, the conscience of the authorities and especially the
conscience of the majority of the public… Hence the disobedience is properly called ‘civil’
because it is part of the civic life of the society. But no such appeal to the public conscience
can be made unless the illegal conduct is done openly, in the public form, as a political act…”
(Bedau, 1991, pp. 6-7).

The latter version put more emphasis on the purpose of civil disobedience
(moral education). In other words, the purpose was crucial to “…turn some but not
all disobedience into civil diosbedience…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 6). So, even though a
person “…commits an act…” “…illegally…”, “…nonviolently…” and
“…conscientiously with the intent to frustrate the laws, policies, or decisions of his
government…”, he is not doing civil disobedience - as he is not doing it
“…publicly…” and with the intent of “…moral education…”. With the latter version

5

of the definition, civil disobedience6 must be a process to make an appeal to others’
conscience.
That’s why, in two senses, this type of law-breaking act cannot be personal (or
can only be public). Firstly, it must be public (or open), meaning “…both the public
and the government should know what he intends to do…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 655). In
the second sense, the act has to aim at certain change in law or policy related to the
“…civic life of the society…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7). This “purpose” is essential to
distinguish civil disobedience from conscientious objection7. This distinction even
casts doubt on what Henry David Thoreau did.
This distinction of purpose makes the tax evasion of Thoreau, in order to show
his discontent with the invasion to Mexico and slavery in the United States, look less
like civil disobedience. Although tax evasion is a normal practise for civil
disobedience, the purpose Thoreau did it makes a difference. Thoreau (1848) wrote
this:
“It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even
the most enormous wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty,
at least, to wash his hands of it,…”

It is obvious that the base for the act, by Thoreau’s word, is to not participate in
injustice. In other words, it is hand-washing. Rather than being a model for others to
follow (what moral education means), doing a tax evasion for “washing his hands” is
not civil disobedience in Bedau’s eyes.
6

Please be reminded that civil disobedience discussed above has not yet been a collective movement.
Bedau has discussed it in a personal perspective, whether one has an obligation to violate law when
he/she thinks that’s wrong to follow.
7
The distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection lies with the purpose. The
former is for public education which aims to urge others to reconsider their support for the “unjust
law”. The latter is for “personal hand-washing” and to avoid conduct “condemned by personal
conscience” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7)

6

Even if a large enough proportion of a population follows their conscience and
disobeys the government (in Thoreau’s thought), the ruling machine then cannot
work in the face of the large friction (in Bedau’s words, “…frustrate the laws, polices
or decisions of the government…”). That means the goal (of what the author of this
thesis calls the minimalist definition), changing the law or policy, can still be served.
However, within the debate of what civil disobedience is, even a large proportion of
a population disobeying their government or a law they regard as unjust is not
counted as civil disobedience in Bedau’s latter definition (what the author of this
thesis calls maximalist definition), but just conscientious objection.8 As readers may
see, only those disobeying with the purpose of changing laws and also exercising
moral education should be named “civil” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7).
Here we should have a little summary on the definitions mentioned above - due
to their importance to the whole thesis. The author would regard the former
definition made by Hugo A. Bedau in 1961 as a minimalist definition for people
claiming they are carrying out civil disobedience. It is more or less a restriction on
their behaviors: that is to be illegal, public, nonviolent and conscientious, but also
with a basic intention to frustrate the laws, policies, or decisions of his government
(Bedau, 1961). But, in the latter version made in 1991, a relatively strict requirement
was added to the intention – that it is to be moral education. It has to be an appeal to
another’s conscience (Bedau, 1991). In the author’s view, this is a maximalist
definition.

8

Further discussion is out of the remit of this study. Here, the author would like to outline the
complexity of the discussion with regard to purpose. As there are some scholars that define purpose
more broadly, like Howard Zinn in his Disobedience and Democracy (New York: Random House,
1968, p. 119), where he defines it as “…deliberate, discriminate violation of law for a vital social
purpose…”, there are some scholars who ignore the debate with regard to purpose and focus on other
issues, like Carl Cohen in his Civil Disobedience and the Law, where he refrains from defining civil
disobedience with absolute precision but just as “…illegal, public protest, non-violent in character…”
(1966, p. 2-3).

7

The components of the minimalist definition, like illegality, a public nature and
a conscientious stance, will not be discussed here as they are not controversial. But a
crucial element of the minimalist definition of civil disobedience, “violence”, has to
be highlighted here. It is usual in the circle of philosophers that contributed to the
discussion of civil disobedience to advocate the element of nonviolence in their
definitions (Largely due to the widespread acceptance of the definition provided by
Hugo Adam Bedau and John Rawls respectively).9 However, there are some
philosophers that do not agree with taking this idea of nonviolence for granted. John
Morreall has made an attempt to challenge this sensitive issue by providing an
exploration of what violence is and, by offering an account of possible “justifiable
violent acts”, voiced out a possibility of justifiable, violent civil disobedience
(Morreall, 1976). By pointing out the rather narrow traditional explanation of what
violence has meant in academic circles, Morreall disagreed with confining violence
to physical violence only (Morreall, 1976). Morreall contended that there are many
ways which violence can be done to people without any physical contact, such as
psychological harm or harming the property of a person, which will in turn harm the
rights of him/her as a person.10 In other words, it constitutes an expansion of the very
definition of violence. This expansion of the definition of violence makes doubtful
some taken-for-granted ways of conducting civil disobedience, especially those
originally regarded as nonviolent. For example, one may regard a sit-in as a
See Hugo A. Bedau, “On Civil Disobedience”, Journal of Philosophy (1961). Also, see John Rawls,
“Definition and Justification of Civil Disobedience”, In Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus
(1991). Many practitioners will stick largely with the principle of nonviolence in order to show their
pacifist ideas or to gain legitimacy from those well-known paragons of civil disobedience like Gandhi
and King. However, as in the circle of philosophers, there is divergence on what is to be counted as
violent.
10
John Morreall pointed out that there is a possibility to harm an object which will not in turn harm
one’s rights. One can think of harming your neighbor’s property (e.g. a new car) and a car which has
been dumped in the city dump. Throwing a stone through the window of the former and latter would
be greatly different acts. So, Morreall contended that destroying the latter should not be regarded as
violence because neither human dignity nor the rights of a person were harmed. (Morreall, 1976, p.
134)
9

8

nonviolent way to conduct civil disobedience. However, Morreall posed the question
that if “…you and six hundred of your comrades refuse to leave one’s office building
until he does “agree” to accept your demands…”, can it still be regarded as
nonviolent? Is there any psychological harm done to him?
After pointing out that acts originally conceptualized as nonviolent may be
coercive (in that they also infringed the rights of a person), Morreall questioned the
original justification for nonviolent civil disobedience in the light of the expanded
definition (1976, p. 136). In other words, if we simply think that violent acts are not
justifiable due to the infringement of another’s rights, we should also eliminate
coercive acts in order to keep logically consistent.
Morreall went one step further and contended that we should simply endorse
the possibility of a justifiable violent civil disobedience. His idea is made clearer
with the following example: (1976, p. 137)
“...the slave-owner chasing a runaway slave in the United States of the 1850s. If he has almost
caught up with the slave, and my engaging him in a fistfight would give the slave the few precious
minutes he needs to get away again, then I would be perfectly justified in grabbing the man and
knocking him to the ground to give the slave the time he needs.”

In the face of larger justice, a certain level of infringement of another’s rights
(life or property) seems justifiable in his view. The point Morreall emphasized is that
“…for the rights which physical violence or coercion violate, the rights which laws
are set up to protect, are not absolute rights, but only, as we have been saying, prima
facie rights” (1976, p. 137). Morreall explained more clearly with the following
words:

9

In sum, Morreall had firstly provided a different definition of violence, which
may include psychological harm, and, secondly, provided a justification for violent
civil disobedience. In my opinion, Morreall did question the taken-for-granted ways
of conducting civil disobedience, like sit-ins, which appear to be nonviolent at first
sight. That made people reflect as to whether the originally “nonviolent” ways were
really nonviolent. That’s his first contribution.
However, with regard to his second contribution, it would be difficult to
convince the public that they needed to tolerate your violent acts (within the
circumstance that you first need convince them of why you need to violate the law).
It would be really troublesome to convince the public you are conducting “moral
education” on one hand while acting violently11 on the other. It is about an ability to
be convincing. So, the author of this study would regard the choice between violent
or nonviolent acts as a decision of calculation and tactics, but not especially a matter
of principle. Morreall summed up it well: “…the significant line to be drawn here is
between coercion and persuasion.” (1976, p. 136)
As Hugo Bedau comments in his book: (1991, pp. 10-11)
“…John Rawls, who was perhaps the first philosopher really to devote careful thought to the
nature and justification of civil disobedience from within the framework of a general theory of
social justice and liberal democracy. The issues raised by Rawls’s approach concern not only
all those already noticed but several others as well.”

It is for sure that “nonviolence” would not be neglected by this founding theory
in the field. Rawls indeed agreed that civil disobedience should be nonviolent (1971,
p. 106). However, I would not agree that Rawls’s theory eliminated the possibility of
11

Violence here means not only physical violence, but also psychological, damaging one’s property.
For example, in the wave against the Vietnam War in US, the anti-war activists burned the draft files
in order to stop the invasion in Vietnam.

10

a violent civil disobedience. As Morreall’s comment on “traditional” theorists put it:
(1976, p. 130)
“Among these one of the most frequently mentioned is nonviolence. Some thinkers, like Bedau
and Wasserstrom, require an act to be nonviolent before they will even count it as an act of
civil disobedience;”

It is extremely clear that Morreall believes that Bedau’s theory would eliminate
all possibility of violent civil disobedience. However, I don’t think Rawls’s theory is
firmly in agreement with this. Let’s scrutinize Rawls’s theory first.
Rawls’s reasoning on the nature of “nonviolence” is simple. Civil disobedience
is nonviolent for the reason that it is a “public act” which means that it is “…not only
addressed to public principle, it is done in public…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 106). Rawls
even overtly claimed that: (1971, p. 106)
“It tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against persons, not from the abhorrence of the
use of force in principle, but because it is a final expression of one’s case.”

I think it is clear enough. It is just about “final expression”. Rawls is on the
side advocating a nonviolent civil disobedience, but the reason why nonviolence is
included in the definition is just a result of calculation, not an “abhorrence of use of
force in principle”. So, the author of this thesis would weigh that the label civil
disobedience can be applied to a movement if a movement is nonviolent in its final
expression. In other words, whether it is largely or generally nonviolent. And here
nonviolence would be regarded in the traditional sense - that is not to harm another’s
body.
As Morreall has expanded the definition of violence (like harming one’s
property or psychological harm) and shown the possibility of justifiable violent civil
11

disobedience in the “slave-owner case” quoted above, the author of this thesis would
hold the view that it seems to be justifiable to use a certain extent of violence in a
case like that. While it is obviously harder to justify violent civil disobedience, the
author of this thesis would not hold the view that it is impossible to combine violence
with civil disobedience. Once the reason to use certain extent of violence is strong
enough, it seems to be possible to use it to stop the larger evil.
So, the author of this thesis would regard the element of nonviolence as one
important element when classifying whether a movement is civil disobedience or not.
Nonviolence, in the following chapters, would be in the sense of avoiding harm to
another’s body and life in the final expression of the movement. It is just a general
image or impression of the movement as a whole. The violation of another’s property
rights would be weighed case by case, but the psychological harm raised by Morreall
would not be taken in consideration. The definitions of civil disobedience will be
used in this thesis for classifying whether one movement should be investigated
empirically or not, the major thread of discussion will not be on the nature of the
definitions.
The philosophical debate on the definition of violence and its justification
seems to be endless. But for this thesis regarding civil disobedience as a phenomenon,
we have to get a definition which can be used for distinguishing which acts should be
counted and which cannot. This thesis will choose a combination of both the
minimalist definition of civil disobedience:
“…illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the
laws, policies, or decisions of his government…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 661)

and the maximalist definition:
12

“…educate the public what is ‘right’…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7)

So, the above comprehensive definition will be employed for the ease of
understanding and empirical analysis in the following passages.
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1.2.2 Justification of Civil Disobedience
The justification of acts of civil disobedience is another realm for debate.
Rawls’s ground-breaking work laid down three conditions for justifying civil
disobedience.12 Locating the theory of civil disobedience within his Theory of Justice,
Rawls put the first condition as “…infringements of the first principle of justice, the
principle of equal liberty, and to blatant violations of the second part of the second
principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity…” (1971, p. 109). The
expression of this in real-life institutions would be being “…denied the right to vote
or to hold office, or to own property and to move from place to place, or when
certain religious groups are repressed and others denied various opportunities…”
(Rawls, 1971, p. 109).
The second condition is when the “normal appeals” to the political majority
have failed, and legal means have been proved of “no avail” (Rawls, 1971, p. 110).
For instance, when the existing political parties have neglected the claims of a
minority and they are unwilling/have no incentive to accommodate them. So, one
may ask, should we justify an act of civil disobedience after employing each of every
other legal means in the world?
Rawls emphasized that it is not the case. He was not proposing that all the legal
means needed to “…have been exhausted…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 110). At the point
when civil disobedience is justified, “…further normal appeals can be repeated; free
speech is always possible. But if past actions have shown the majority immovable or

12

The conditions laid by John Rawls are conditions where justifiable civil disobedience can be
grounded. In the author’s sense, it is not the same as conditions explaining why civil disobedience
emerges.
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apathetic, further attempts may reasonably be thought fruitless, and a second
condition for justified civil disobedience is met…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 110). 13
Rawls’s two conditions that are mentioned above are fundamental to my study
in two senses. Firstly, he justified acts of civil disobedience in a nearly just society
(where constitutional democracy is met). It grants the people within a nearly just
society a right to engage in civil disobedience, but does civil disobedience emerge in
this way? It has directed this study on searching the sociopolitical condition in which
people may think normal means are proved to be “no avail”. Although the conditions
above are mainly tackling a question of when civil disobedience is justified, the
similar argument “civil disobedience emerges when normal and legal means are
thought to be fruitless” is common when people try to explain why they would
employ civil disobedience as a protest means. However, it is not really refutable.
Further effort is needed to explain how this specific kind of movements emerge. It
leads to the question of whether civil disobedience movements really emerges as a
last resort, or whether it is really practical to launch civil disobedience when all other
ways of protest have been used up or been proved fruitless. The author of this thesis
tends to incline towards the view that when other normal or legal ways are shown14
to be useless, it is more justifiable. But it is irrelevant to the explanation of its
emergence. What we have to focus on is the sociopolitical conditions of its
emergence. In other words, it is used because it is favored by conditions. And in
author’s view, the above notion (legal ways proved no avail) will be more likely to
germinate under such conditions.
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The third condition will be kept to be short here. It is rather complicated. More or less, it is saying
that when the two conditions are sufficient enough to justify, there would be more than one or even a
lot of groups that may use civil disobedience. How to solve this problem where most of them are
sufficiently justified? Rawls proposed an alliance among leaders. (Rawls, 1971, p. 111)
14
Here it doesn’t mean the initiators have to try all of them, but at least to convince others with words.
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So, this study will focus on what sociopolitical conditions (necessary and
sufficient) would be for the participants to regard that the means, civil disobedience,
might be effective and useful.
1.2.3 Studies of social movements in Hong Kong and the related theories of
emergence of social movements
Studies of social movements are not and have never been the main focus on the
stage called Hong Kong Studies. Due to the prevailing ‘political stability’ holding
sway at the time,15 the central question to tackle has always been the “stability of the
anachronistic colonial political system”. There has been no need to mention
explanations of the emergence of social movements (Lui T.-l. &.-k., 2000, p. 2). So,
the pioneers of the field have aimed at debunking the “myth” of political stability16 in
some of their studies (Lui T.-l. &., 1997; 1999) and also bringing social movements
into view - as they had been neglected due to the high threshold of instability (Lui T.l. &.-k., 2000, p. 5).
Departing from the myth, scholars studying social movements have been
drawn to the series of social movements of the 1970s. They have studied social
movements from the perspective of types17 and sometimes aggregately - as in the
emergence of pressure group politics18. They have rarely put their focus on the
means of protest.
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Founded by classical studies like (King, 1981) and (Lau S.-k. , 1983).
King claims clearly in his work, the concern of his paper is “the way Hong Kong’s political system
has coped with the problem of stability” (King, 1984, p. 129). And Lau Siu-kai tackles the same
“problem of political stability” by understanding the “typical normative and behavioral patterns of the
Chinese majority” (Lau S.-k. , 1984, pp. 195-196).
17
For instance, for student movements see (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1983) (Leung B. K.-p.,
1992). Urban social movement: see (Lui T.-l. , 1984) (Lui T.-l. &., 1985). Labor movement: see (Chiu,
1987) (Leung B. K.-p., 1992).
18
See (Lai T.-y. , 1984) (Lee, Hong Kong Politics and Society in Trasition, 1987) (Lee, 1984)
16
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Lui has explained the reasons why social movements in 1970s emerged as a
way of protest. He made use of the theory of the political opportunity structure model
to understand the rise of protest actions in 1970s and its channel to formal
institutional politics in 1980s. Simply put, the rise of protest action in 1970s was the
result of the closed political structure and the decline of it was the opening of “…new
political opportunities…” brought about by the special historical context (Lui T.-l. &.,
1997, pp. 104, 107).
In fact, the theory of political opportunity structure shares the intellectual
heritage from the resource mobilization theory. Both of the “schools” regard
dissenters launching social movements as a rational attempts, after weighing the
benefit and cost (McAdam, 1999, p. 37). Their difference lies with the focus they put,
the former emphasizes the “larger sociopolitical environment” in which “movements
develop in response to an ongoing process” (McAdam, 1999, p. 40)19. Despite of the
difference mentioned, the author of this thesis would regard the theories as a
guidance, but not constraint. So, both of the theories above would be employed
throughout the analysis (especially when the favorable condition is being discussed).
The larger sociopolitical environment, in my eye, would affect the cost and
benefit of dissenters, for making their decision whether and when to launch a social
movements. The process of decision making would follows:
1. Collective action costs something.
2. All contenders count costs.
3. Collective action brings benefits, in the form of collective goods.
4. Contenders continuously weigh expected costs against expected benefits.
The distinction between “schools” may be controversial as it is only the distinction made by the
author mentioned.
19
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5. Both costs and benefits are uncertain because (a) contenders have imperfect
information about the current state of the polity; (b) all parties engage in
strategic interaction. (Tilly, 1978, p. 99)
The first four steps are simply the calculation on cost and benefit among the
activists (or within their own mind). The last step is just the link between the larger
sociopolitical condition and the calculation. So, the calculation can go in this way:

Dissenters’
cost/benefit
analysis

Collective
Movements

Sociopolitical
Environment

Sociopolitical
Collective
Figure
1 Cost/Benefit, collective movement and
environment

The rise and decline of protest actions in Hong Kong have been better
understood in the light shed by these studies. However, the studies on emergence
were separated into types - for example, urban movements and labor movements.
The means of protest has not been well studied20. The explanation of the emergence
of protest actions in the 1970s with the theory of political opportunity structure made
by Lui and Chiu (1997) has inspired this study, which focuses on the sociopolitical
conditions facilitating the emergence of movements and the employment of civil

20

For example, civil disobedience, as one means of protest, has not been studied in the academic
circle in Hong Kong.
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disobedience as protest means. In other words, except relying on the explanation of
the “closed political system”, would there be any other possibilities?
In fact, there is some resemblance between the explanation (“closed political
system”) of protest action posed by Lui and Chiu and the second condition posed by
Rawls (normal and the legal means have been proved of “no avail”) (Rawls, 1971, p.
110). They are guided in the same direction: the rise of protest in 1970s Hong Kong
was forced by the closed political system - civil disobedience is more justified when
other ways have proved of no avail. It is highly related to the openness of political or
legal institutions.
If we simply employed this answer to solve the question of why civil
disobedience emerged in Hong Kong, would that be satisfactory? As one may know,
civil disobedience has emerged in Hong Kong in different periods (e.g. 1979, 1992,
2000 and 2005). Would the political systems in these different periods all be closed?
Would the normal and legal means at the times above have been to no avail? The
political systems might be, in someone’s eye, still closed – even though reforms had
been in the pipeline. The answers, “closed political system” or “no normal ways out”,
may always holds in those eyes of the initiators and sympathizers, but not irrefutably
in the eyes of researchers. To explain why civil disobedience movements emerge
from time to time, more research is needed, and this is the main task of this piece of
study.
1.2.4 Definition of “civil society”
Before providing my own hypothesis, a crucial definition has to be outlined
first. As a very crucial part of the following hypothesis and the thesis as a whole (the

19

necessary condition for the emergence of civil disobedience21), it is necessary to
discuss the debate about the definition of civil society.
The concept of civil society has its own developmental history. The very old
definition (often called the original or classical definition) was provided at the time
of Plato and Aristotle (Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 84) (Ehrenberg, 1999). Under the
heading politike koinonia (political society/community), it was defined as a “public
ethical-political community of free and equal citizens under a legally defined system
of rule” (Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 84). However, the “rule” here does mean the
written law or any laws in the modern sense, but the ethos - “…a common set of
norms and values defining not only political procedures but also a substantive form
of life based on a developed catalogue of preferred virtues…” (Cohen & Andrew,
1992, p. 84). Also, the definition of civil society or political community here did not
allow the “…distinction between state and society…” (Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p.
84).
The Medieval definition was that civil society (in the Christian theories) was
politically constituted to “…serve God’s purposes…” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xi). It was
“…organized around humanity’s fallen condition…” and “…emphasized
dependence…” The major difference with the previous definition is that the medieval
theories “…initially denied that the works of human beings could guide moral
action…” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xi).
The watershed between the traditional (classical and medieval) and the modern
meanings of civil society were the “…development toward absolutism…” (Cohen &
Andrew, 1992, p. 86). Thomas Hobbes, in his Leviathan, announced not only the

21

The reason why it is the necessary condition will be discussed further in Chapter 2.
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constitution of sovereign power but also the civil society, as the “…artificial
creation…” of the former (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xi). Whether civil society is created
by state power was in question, but it was a watershed because of the distinction
drawn between state and society. The transition had historical roots. It was
complemented by the “…emergence of autonomous religious bodies tolerated by a
more secular state…” and the “…rise of new forms of private economic activity…”
(Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 86).
This idea was shown in Locke’s understanding of civil society, as
“…constituted by property, production, and acquisition required by a law-governed
state to preserve order and protect liberty…” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xiii). It draws the
distinction of the state protecting one’s liberty. So, one may see that the autonomy
enjoyed by civil society is the result of the distinction from the state.
Emphasizing the negative liberty is in the line of liberalism. Another line of
discussion on civil society is in the sphere of republicanism (or someone called it
communitarianism) (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 13). It was a response towards extreme
individualism. In Gellner’s words, the “…individualism inherent in the condition of
modular man … was hostile to the cult of community…” (Gellner, 1995, p. 46).
Representatives of this line of thought would be Hannah Arendt, Robert Putnam,
Richard Sennet, Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse22, who were worried about
the “…disintegrative effects…” that would limit the abilities of civil society
(Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xvi) (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 14).
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This simplification would not be perfect in summarizing the theories of the scholars above.
However, this thesis will only need a working definition of civil society - describing what will be
included in this categorization of our lives - so that the discussion will not be bogged down in too
much detail.
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So, after discussion of the development of the concept itself, which might be
employed for the investigation further? Is there any “working” definition that could
be borrowed for empirical analysis? In Cohen’s words, “civil society” can be
understood as follows:
“…a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the
intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication… institutionalized and
generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights, that stabilize social differentiation…”
(Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. ix).

This working definition of civil society can be summarized into a few
indicators: 1) autonomy from state and economy; 2) openness (above all, of the
intimate spheres like families, which are closed); 3) with voluntary participation; 4)
for citizens to communicate and associate. These indicators might not be perfectly
accurate, but fair enough for scholarly investigation23.
1.2.5 Delegitimation
Another important building block of this thesis, the sufficient condition24, is
constituted by one famous but controversial concept in political science, the
legitimacy.
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These indicators have been used in some scholarly investigations by local scholars in their
explorations of civil society in Hong Kong. For example in Chan Kin-man’s Towards Civil Society (in
Chinese).
24
Emphasize once again, the sufficient condition proposed in this thesis cannot be examined in a
theoretical way. It is because the sufficient condition, practically, has some kind of relationship with
the necessary condition. In other words, the necessary condition (existence of civil society) is not only
necessary to the emergence of civil disobedience, but also has positive relationship with the sufficient
condition (delegitimizing effect). Although this may not be perfect in scientific investigation, this
might be a common constraint faced by social scientists on their limited manipulability on controlling
factors.
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As the author of this thesis calls, delegitimizing effect as the sufficient
condition, is the drain of legitimacy by the action or inaction of government. And
legitimacy’s definition needs to occupy some space of this chapter.
Legitimacy is the “recognition of the right to govern” (Coicaud, 2002, p. 10). It
is fundamental to the ruler on which the ruler can guarantee the obedience of the
ruled25. This recognition is constituted mainly by three elements26 in its
contemporary sense.
The elements proposed by David Beetham included legal validity, beliefs and
values, and consent derived from actions expressive of it (Beetham, 1991, pp. 12-13).
Another scholar, Jean Marc Coicaud, has shared the similar thought. Coicaud claims
that were consent, law and norms being constitutive of legitimacy (Coicaud, 2002, p.
10). Coicaud also claims that the three elements are “indissociable” in reality and
sharing a complementary relationship (Coicaud, 2002, p. 10).
Although in Coicaud’s eye, the three elements are “indissociable”, this thesis
would like to emphasize two of the three elements which are the beliefs and values,
and legal validity. The first one is saying when government is doing in accordance to
the general beliefs and values of the public, the legitimacy of her will be enhanced
(or vice versa). The second one is saying when government is doing something in
accordance to the higher law or constitutional law, the legitimacy of her will be
enhanced (or vice versa).
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It is undeniable that some governments in history can govern without (or with not much) legitimacy,
but solely by coercion and fear or performance. However, this kind of government needs to live with
caution, once the economy goes down or the police system doesn’t work, larger force is needed to
stabilize the society.
26
The elements contributing to legitimacy are not without controversy. The famous but old definition
was provided by Max Weber. His taxonomy of elements were traditional, legal, and charismatic
(Scott, 1993, p. 55). Also quoted by Ian Scott, the definition provided by David Beetham would be
employed.
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They are the two crucial components in the arguments brought by civil
disobedience movements’ initiators. (For example, in the cases posed in the chapters
3 and 4, the Basic Law are used to support their claims that government is not acting
legally valid; or some acts of government leads people to question whether it is
harming their freedom of speech or protest, these are the examples intruding their
beliefs and values27)
So, when the author of this thesis discuss in concrete examples on the
delegitimizing effect, it is saying the legitimacy of government is being harmed, in
the ways of either legal validity or moral authority (or both). And at the time, more
words would be spent on the linkage between the facts or events and the harm of
legitimacy through the above two ways. For now, an operational definition of
legitimacy would be provided first in avoidance of endless dispute on this
controversial concept.

These claims are largely normative. They are always “just” versus “unjust” or “good” versus “evil”.
It would be more easily understood that the complex legal argument, so it is more common. But
importantly, these normative claims are backed up by the beliefs in rights or freedom, or linked to
their belief in morality.
27
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1.3 Summary
We can see that the above discussion is largely separated into three parts. The
first is the major debates on “what is civil disobedience” and its justification28. The
second is on the study of social movements in Hong Kong and the related social
movement theories. The last part is the definition of civil society and legitimacy.
The first part will be useful for the discussion later, on distinguishing what
should be counted as civil disobedience and what shouldn’t. The discussion on
justifiability can show the distance between ideas and actions because the
justification can only provide grounds for the emergence of civil disobedience
movement, but not explaining its emergence. In other words, this part has shown the
limited exploration on the same topic.
The second part explores what studies concerning social movements in Hong
Kong have been done. Although they were not directly aiming at the emergence of
civil disobedience, they have provided important insights to this study. Mainly, they
have separated their studies by different types of social movements - the means has
rarely been the question and there has been no need to discuss it with regard to civil
disobedience. However, the study of Lui and Chiu (1997) has provided an important
insight to this study. Their explanation on the emergence of protest actions in 1970s
and their decline in 1980s with the increasing openness of the political system has
inspired this study to understand emergence of civil disobedience movement in the
light of cost/benefit analysis, in relation to the larger sociopolitical condition.
So, the author would like to show the limited investigation on the question
posed with the first two parts of literature review. The third part helps to give us a
28

Its purpose, nonviolence, and being punished or not affect the justifiability morally, legally or
politically.
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primary idea of what civil society is, which is very important building block when
explaining why civil disobedience emerges (this will be discussed in detail in chapter
2). Another building block, the sufficient condition, is composed by the widespread
concept legitimacy. This has been discussed in the third part also.
So, it has been shown that this study’s focus has not been comprehensively
discussed by the scholars whose works have just been examined. The centrality of
the research question “why civil disobedience as a political phenomenon emerges”
has been neglected by these scholars. However, the hypothesis of this study is
inspired by the studies mentioned above. It will now come to more detailed
discussion on the methodology used in answering the question.

26

1.4 Methodology
Due to the limited exploration by political scientists (and the even more limited
exploration in the context of Hong Kong) on this topic, the history of Nazi Germany
and India will be studied within the framework of the topic of civil disobedience in
chapter 2. This will lead to a hypothesis being drawn that will be tested in chapters 3
and 4, with the data having been collected in Hong Kong. The data used for testing
the hypothesis is from semi-structured interviews with dissenters who have launched
civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. The aim of this study is to find out
under what sociopolitical conditions the dissenters perceived the legal, normal access
no longer useful and under what sociopolitical conditions they decided to launch
civil disobedience movements. While this hypothesis will not aim to provide an
explanation for the civil disobedience movements of the whole world, it will at least
provide a refutable hypothesis in the field of Hong Kong Studies. The detailed
discussion of the insights gained and contribution will be reserved to the last chapter.
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Chapter 2 Hypothesis Building: the case of the White Rose
in Nazi Germany and the case of India
Due to the limited study done on the specific question of this thesis, this study
cannot act as a revision to previous theories, but has to build a new theory to
understand the question posed. For what reasons, have civil disobedience movements
emerged in Hong Kong?
It then comes to the question of empirical observation in reality, but not
abstract debate on the nature of what civil disobedience as a concept is (which is
provided in chapter 1). So, what would civil disobedience movements be practically?
It comes down to the problem of significance. As a pioneer, Hannah Arendt posed
this question to those philosophers of her time and she claimed this problem is
“…seldom admitted…” She brought the number of participants into consideration
(Arendt, 1972, p. 55).
This is impossible to be missed when we have to conduct an empirical study on
civil disobedience movements. It would be a process or consequence in which people
being convinced by the initiator(s) to participate in the nonviolent and illegal actions.
It would be a transmission from the conscience of the initiators to that of the
sympathizers. And civil disobedience carried out by only one or a few can be ignored
if we want to observe those civil disobedience movements with political impact.29
On explaining the emergence of significant civil disobedience, Arendt (1972, p.
74) has provided one more insight that builds on the similar insight posed by Rawls
before (no normal channels). Civil disobedience is not only the last resort, but also a

And, also, that is too hard to observe. In Arendt’s words, civil disobedience practiced by a single
individual is rather eccentric and not significant enough to be suppressed (Arendt, 1972, p. 55).
29
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weapon exposing the weakness of government when “…legality and constitutionality
are open to grave doubt…” In other words, it is used not because there is no options
left, but because it would expose the weakness of government. It is chosen
intentionally at the right time.
This was a new insight into the exploration of sociopolitical conditions. Except
explaining the emergence of civil disobedience as a last resort (which is easily
subjected to question, as shown in chapter 1), we can now also focus on the
sociopolitical conditions favoring the act, under which the means is employed
deliberately.
When we come to discuss a pre-existing condition, it can be distinguished into
two types, necessary and sufficient. Due to the lack of similar studies focusing on
Hong Kong, the author of this study has had to borrow insights from foreign cases.
The discussion on the White Rose in Nazi Germany is concerned with the necessary
condition, and later on with the sufficient condition – borrowing the example of the
Salt March in India.
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2.1 On Necessary Condition: the case of the White Rose
We cannot observe civil disobedience movements emerged in Nazi Germany,
but there were resisting acts very similar to civil disobedience. However, due to the
constraint of environment, it was not possible to evolve these acts into full civil
disobedience movements.
Before going deep into the discussion of the environmental constraints and the
necessary condition, a brief historical background should be provided. What had
been done by the White Rose? It was an organization formed by close friends. The
most well-known members were Hans Scholl and Sophie Scholl30. From the point
they decided to act to their deaths, there was a period of eight months only (Scholl,
1970).
What had been done that cost their lives? At the very beginning, they were just
gathering for the study of literature and history. Although there were books banned,
their acts were by no means contentious, not to mention civilly disobedient. Their
acts turned overtly political in June 1942. They decided to distribute leaflets that
raised the awareness of the Germans31 that their responsibility was to oppose the evil
regime lest “…shame… befall us and our children…” as a “…member of Christian
and Western civilization…” (Scholl, 1970, p. 74).
They distributed six leaflets in total. The leaflets were not only designed to
convince the people that the regime was evil, but also asked them to act and to pose
resistance to the “…war machine…” (Scholl, 1970, p. 83). Although sabotage, in
30

The story of these siblings has been filmed and documented. Some examples are: Sophie Scholl:
The Final Days (film), Sophie Scholl: The Real Story of the Woman who Defied Hitler (book) and The
White Rose – Munich 1942-1943 (book).
31
Some say different leaflets out of the six in total were aimed at different groups of audience.
Petrescu (2010, p. 147) claimed that first four were addressed to the “intellectual”
(Bildungsbourgeoisie) who was trusted to have more “political responsibility to take up
responsibility”. And the last two were aimed at the general public.
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some eyes, may be violent, the actions that they called for were largely nonviolent
(they called it passive resistance) (Scholl, 1970, pp. 82-83).
At the time, the “public realm” was dictated by party propaganda - there was
no space for autonomous discussion or open criticism (Petrescu, 2010, p. 3). What
they were doing was illegal for sure. Their call was from their conscience and
heavily related to morality and religion. They accused the regime of being the
murderer of the three hundred thousand Jews and accused the readers of continuing
to “…slumber on in their dull, stupid sleep…”, further challenging the reader that
they “…have sunk into a fatal consciencelessness…” (Scholl, 1970, p. 79).
What they had done fulfilled the combined definition of civil disobedience
(illegal, nonviolent, conscientious and moral education) except with respect to one
point: publicness.
Under totalitarianism32, one may need to strive to not to be labeled as a
“…saboteur, a Trotskyite, a foreign spy, or a Fascist…” (Arendt, 1958, p. 323). It is
extremely costly to act according to one’s conscience. It may cost not only your own
life, but the lives of your wife, children and your mere acquaintances. If one is bold
enough to act according to your conscience (like the members of the White Rose), it
would be hard to guarantee that the people around you would not act as a
whistleblower to safeguard their own family. It is the choice between “…murder and
murder…” mentioned by Arendt (Arendt, 1958, p. 452).
So, even if one dares to do something illegal publicly, the people around the
actor might very well report to the secret police as soon as possible to avoid being
accused of collusion. This was exactly the fate of Hans and Sophie. When they were
Society under such a regime is “…mass atomized…” (Arendt, 1958, p. 323) and run through with
terror. You will never know who among you might be secret police.
32
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distributing their last leaflet at the University of Munich on 18 Feb 1943, they were
spotted and were reported to the Gestapo (Scholl, 1970, p. 52). That kind of
environment would hinder the emergence of civil disobedience, as a public act, in
two senses.
Firstly, for the initiators, it means that it is with extremely high cost to launch
civil disobedience movement as a process of moral education. This process may take
time and, in the meantime, your lives might be forfeited before any significant
political impact is caused. If one really dares to go against the regime, one might
choose the means more likely to succeed and take less time, in other words,
revolutionary, rather than appealing to another’s conscience and longing for their
response.
Secondly, for the sympathizers, it might also involve an extremely high cost to
participate in civil disobedience movements. You might never know who around you
could be secret police or a spy. Also, in a society where the media is totally
controlled for party propaganda, the information of civil disobedience might be hard,
if not impossible, to spread.
If someone is dare enough to overcome the cost (his/her life) to educate others
the evilness of the regime, and if someone is luckily enough to receive the
information and follow the acts, the civil disobedience movement is hardly to be
significant. The only result for the conscientious acts under totalitarianism would be
insignificant or eccentric, rather than politically significant. The reason lies with the
lack of civil society, as a public space in which freedom of speech protected by law.
If we borrow varied definitions of civil society (for example, political
society/community in Aristotle’s epoch or civil society in Locke’s understanding), the
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public space has to be protected by a certain system of “rule”33. In the contemporary
sense, freedom of speech has to be protected by law (like constitution) and based on
that, civil society can be built upon. An easy measurement would be the free press34,
which is the backbone of civil society. It is because with the free press, public space
can be reserved for the discussion of political matters35, evaluation or even criticism
on performance of leaders. These critical comments may not only be shown on
papers, but also in real actions, for instance protest.
So, if people are agitated (like by the performance of the political leaders),
people can gather and air their grievance. In this sense, the freedom of association36
is closed linked to the freedom of speech preceding. If this grievance is long-lasting,
organizations may be formed to voice and propose in a continual way. Finally, if
political system has opened, some organizations may form political party further to
be the surgeon of society themselves.
These requirement should be too far from the situation in Nazi Germany. It is
even questionable whether the first step is met. It is because freedom of speech
would cost your lives.
The author would like stress that civil society would have its own pace of
development. Freedom of speech guaranteed by law would be the starting point, but
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No matter written law or unwritten or just a general understanding of virtue.
Free press here would not means autonomous from anything, for instance the market. Free press
here just means autonomous from the government.
35
Although one may criticize the level of participation of a laymen in the discussion (especially the
media company is a big one), he/she can still choose another media report. This can be regarded as a
participation though the passages are not written by them.
36
Audience may question whether freedom of association exist when we come across the 1979 Yau
Ma Tei Boat People Incident. In that case, the targeted law to be challenged is exactly the law
restricting the freedom of association (certain number of people were not allowed to gather). However,
does it mean freedom of association was not existing at the time? The answer is no, because before the
Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident turned into civil disobedience movement, people can gather
collectively to protest without being charged by the law. It was because the arbitrary law was not
implemented by the police in most of the time. The freedom of association was then not seriously
weakened, as if the case in Nazi Germany. (Further discussion would be left to the Section 5.2)
34

33

author would not regard this to be the necessary condition because civil disobedience
movements are still hard to be launched when individuals have their freedom to
speak, but no chance to communicate with others in the society. (Or they cannot get
known to other’s ideas, whether they share the same idea with me) And if people can
communicate and exchange their ideas on politics, they may commit into collective
action, as a platform to show their similar political ideas and claims. Freedom of
association is then inherited or closed linked to the freedom of speech.
As the audience may notice, the above definition of civil society is not an
absolute concept. The existence of civil society can be a relative concept instead, in
which civil society is not developed once and for all. So, the author would like to
propose a developing civil society (or quasi-civil society) to be the necessary
condition. “Quasi-civil society” means free press could exist to represent some
voices in the society37 and people can get known to other’s idea from there and act
collectively. The free press can then exist as a public realm in which freedom of
speech is shown and where the common thought is germinated.
In this vein, if one has to launch civil disobedience movement, the existence of
a quasi-civil society in which the freedom of speech and certain level of freedom of
association is protected would be a necessary condition. In the case of Nazi Germany
where the public realm was reserved solely for the party propaganda and the law (no
need to mention public collective movement) was just an instrument of the ruler,
civil disobedience movements was just impossible to be launched - even though
there were actors willing to sacrifice their lives for conscience and truth.

37

Quasi- here means half-developed. The author would regard people participate voluntarily in
politics (like run for election) to be a milestone for mature civil society. So, when people receive
frequently other’s idea from the free press would be in the half way of development.
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2.2 On Sufficient Condition: the case of India
Mahatma Gandhi is well-known for his leadership in civil disobedience (or
Satyagraha – truth-force) as a special means of protest. His philosophy has been the
main focus when one mentions Mahatma Gandhi. However, the sociopolitical
conditions underlining his civil disobedience movements have not been systematized
with reference to the study of civil disobedience. This section will focus on the
sufficient condition38 of the movement(s).
In the 1920s and 1930s, Gandhi had made two attempts with his special protest
means - civil disobedience. The first wave was following the non-cooperation
movement39 in 1920. The non-cooperation movement intensified in those years and
Gandhi agitated the public to escalate their movements into refusal to join military
service and refusal to pay tax, which is in fact civil disobedience (Ng, 1981, pp. 291292). However, this wave of civil disobedience movement had not been successfully
launched due to the outbreak of violence in the fall of 1921. He was forced to call off
the campaign (Spear, 1966, p. 191). Imprisonment then followed in 1922 (Ng, 1981,
p. 292).
The second wave was not started immediately after his release from prison in
1924, but in 1930 by way of the famous Salt March. Throughout the gap years, he
was fighting for the emancipation of the lowest caste, “Untouchable”, in the caste
system. The caste was then christened as the “Sons of God” or the Harijans (Spear,

Audience please note that “sufficient condition” here cannot be examined philosophically (e.g. A 
B; A cause B), because in the discussion of sufficient condition for emergence of civil disobedience
movements in India, the necessary condition (quasi-civil society) was existing. The evidence is
Gandhi could continually publicize articles in the leading papers both in England and India, for
generating sympathy (Rynne, 2008). Also, he could air his opinion through speeches throughout the
country and through his weekly papers like Young India which lasted for more than ten years. These
conditions cannot be controlled and taken away.
39
It included officials’ resignations, withdrawal from government schools, and a voters’ boycott
(Spear, 1966, p. 191).
38
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1966, p. 195). He publicized his ideas (ashima – nonviolence, satyagraha – truthforce) in his weekly paper, the Young India40, and this paper was read “…more
avidly than any debates in the legislative assemblies…” (Spear, 1966, p. 195).
In the eyes of analysts, he was preparing or waiting for the chance to launch a
second wave of civil disobedience.41 And, in fact, if the Indian was fighting for the
rights of independence on the one hand, and keeping the unequal caste system on the
other, that would greatly harm the justifiability of that stance. So, the postponed
launch of civil disobedience movement was not without reason from the perspective
of justifiability. The discussion of sufficient conditions before the launch of the two
waves of civil disobedience movements are in the followings:
The civil disobedience movements were a part of the Indian independence
movement. As an important watershed of the nationalistic movement, World War I
(WWI) serves as the starting point of a brief discussion about the sufficient
conditions. The nationalistic sentiment had been greatly accelerated by WWI for the
perceived lack of reward for the great contribution of Indian in the war.42 The
performance of Indian soldiers “…took the world by surprise…” and “…thrilled
every British heart…” (Keay, 2000, p. 470). However, the great performance had not

40

This was an influential weekly paper lasting for more than ten years, from 1919 to 1931 (Gandhi,
1922). This is an evidence to the claim that “quasi-civil society” was existing in India at the time,
when Gandhi can publish his ideas through this weekly journal and which has been read avidly. (See
Footnote 46 for detail)
41
Spear claimed that Gandhi was in his “side-wings” “waiting for the political wind to change” (Spear,
1966, p. 195)
42
There was more than two million Indian serving overseas (Keay, 2000, p. 470). And the
contribution of Indian soldiers was commented as “What an army!” by the press New York World
(Wolpert, 2009, p. 302)
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been rewarded in accordance with the demands of the Indians43 and did not satisfy
the nationalist sentiments of the time44.
Aside from the limited rewards, severe punishment had been received by the
Indians. For a replacement of wartime law, Mr. Justice Rowlatt had been appointed
to propose new bills. The Rowlatt bills allowed “…judges to try political cases
without juries…” and power of internment without trial was accorded to provincial
governments (Spear, 1966, p. 190).
Not only were civil rights being harmed, but lives were lost in the same year.
In April 1919, the “pig-headed” Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer marched into a
traditional ceremony with his forces, and shot without warning until their
ammunition was used up. Over 1200 men, women and children were wounded and
379 died under his command - without martial rule imposed (Keay, 2000, p. 476).
One can see that, the grievance of Indians agitated by the “rewards” of the
WWI was not enough to explain the emergence of civil disobedience45, but the
existence of laws and acts severely harming the moral or constitutional ground of the
establishment. Then, the initiator (this time, Gandhi) was able to urge the public not
to cooperate with the “satanic” or “sinful” government (Spear, 1966, p. 190). This
was not just a coincidence.

The demands held by the “Extremists”, Tilak and Mrs. Besant, as the leaders of the Home Rule
Leagues was the right to “home-rule” (Spear, 1966, p. 189). That was not totally independence from
the Empire, but rule by their own ethnicity within the Empire (Ng, 1981, p. 260).
44
There was a reform called the Montagu-Chelmsford report which served as the blueprint for the
next thirty years and it would be a “friendly independence” (Spear, 1966, p. 185). Also, the devolution
of power from the center to the provinces paved the way to “federalism” and a new franchise was
brought into the legislative elections. However, the expectation of Indians was far more than that
(Spear, 1966, p. 185).
45
It was the old explanation of social movement by the Classical school of social movement, inherited
from social psychology.
43
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One may argue that the decision made by the initiator is proactive, especially
by way of the means and way of protest. It is right that the initiator may have room to
choose what is to be done, like sit-ins, non-cooperation or even illegal protests.
However, there should be some sociopolitical conditions underlining the decisions
made, which facilitate or even make it possible. In this case, the Rowlatt bills and the
massacre led by Dyer had greatly harmed the moral authority or “moral pretentions”
of the British (Keay, 2000, p. 476). This harm on moral authority would cause a
delegitimation on the government. This pre-conditioned46 the launch of actions like
refusal of military service and paying tax, which were illegal.
We can examine the sufficient condition of the Salt March, to see if the above
explanation is refuted or not.
As mentioned before, civil disobedience had not been launched immediately
after Gandhi’s release from prison. He had been “waiting for the political wind to
change” (Spear, 1966, p. 195). What constituted that wind to be changed?
After the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform pushed by British in 1919, there was a
ten year internal inquest to reveal any progress. To that end, a commission was
formed, led by Sir John Simon. The Simon Commission was full of Britons; the
report they made was sure in recommending no changes in the central government
and without any word on the complete independence demanded by the Indian.47 This

46

Specifically speaking, the massacre led by General Dyer can show that the necessary condition
cannot be “controlled” like what natural scientists done in laboratory. It is because in the Young India
(1922, v4), Gandhi has accused the government for her wrong-doing. He wrote: “The Government
have been guilty of not coming up to the standard of right-doing which was expected by the people in
the matter of the Punjab and the Khilafat.” The matter of the Punjab is trusted to be the massacre
which was located in a city called Amritsar within the state Punjab.
47
This was demanded in the All Parties Convention and by a constitutional report prepared by Motilal
Nehru, leader of Indian National Congress (Keay, 2000, p. 486).
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was like a break of promises made in their eyes. It was with this pre-condition, the
Salt March was launched in 1930.
To sum up, the Rowlatt Bills, the Massacre led by General Dyer and the report
of Simon Commission share the same characteristics. They harmed the moral ground
and the constitutional ground of the establishment. This is what the author of this
thesis called delegitimizing effect.
The Rowlatt Bills had greatly shrunk the civil rights of the citizens to be judged
fairly and it was seen as an insult to Indians. Keay comments that:
“…(the Rowlatt bills) belied the spirit of the imminent reforms, it insulted a people who had
lately made such heavy sacrifices for the empire, and it foreshadowed British readiness to resort
to further repression…” (2000, p. 474).

The Massacre led by General Dyer was even more questionable for its moral
and constitutional grounds. Lacking the support of martial law, there was no legal
excuse for it. Keay comments that even with the martial law, “Dyer’s conduct would
have been indefensible under any military code…” (Keay, 2000, p. 476).
The report made by the Simon Commission also suffered from the problem of
lack of moral and legal grounds. It was because that it was just the further
investigation on the progress promised by the previous reform. The result of no
change was not acceptable in the eyes of Indians even in 1919, let alone in 1928
when their demands were escalated.
It was under these kinds of sufficient condition that the civil disobedience
movements happened. Although the decision to employ the means is always in the
hands of initiators, the sufficient condition drawing the decision matters. And for the
convenience of later discussion, these kinds of sufficient condition can be framed
39

under the delegitimizing effect, under which “…legality and constitutionality are
open to grave doubt…” (Arendt, 1972, p. 74).
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2.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the hypothesis, with its components (necessary condition and
sufficient condition), has been outlined. Due to the lack of previous studies, the
hypothesis has had to be invented and tested against foreign experience, rather than
studies in Hong Kong. Limited by the length of this study, the history of the Nazi
Germany and India cannot be paved in as much detail as possible, but the author has
tried hard to outline the parts related to the hypothesis building. The hypothesis built
in this chapter will be examined with cases in Hong Kong. The data for case studies
has been collected from semi-structured interviews, especially explanations of the
emergence of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. The hypothesis on the
emergence of civil disobedience is going to be examined as follows:
Necessary Condition: Existence of civil society (quasi-civil society as well) in
which freedom of speech is protected by law
Sufficient Condition: the Delegitimizing Effect
Hypothesis: If civil society exists in Hong Kong, delegitimizing effects then
lead civil disobedience movements to emerge.
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Chapter 3 Citizens’ Radio Incident
This chapter aims to explain the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, as
one case of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. From that, the hypothesis
generated previously can be examined with the empirical data found.
This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will tackle the nature
of the Citizens’ Radio Incident and whether it is civil disobedience from an academic
perspective. The latter part will elaborate on the reasons for the emergence of the
Citizens’ Radio Incident.

3.1 Nature of the Citizens’ Radio Incident
Before we examine the question of why it happened, we have to know whether
the Citizen’s Radio Incident suits our definition of civil disobedience. The discussion
focuses on whether the movements launched by the social activists or the prodemocracy politicians fitted the mold provided to us by the founding theorists.
As previously mentioned in this thesis (the end of Section 1.2.1), this master
thesis chooses the comprehensive definition of civil disobedience as a threshold:
“…illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the
laws, policies, or decisions of his government…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 661)
“…educate the public what is ‘right’…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7)

With this comprehensive version of definitions, we can now assess the
Citizens’ Radio Incident to see whether or not it was a civil disobedience from an
academic perspective.48

48

The problem of significant or not is suffering from some subjectivity, one may just think they are
eccentric. However, from the list of the guests who have been there, it is for sure significant. It is
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3.1.1 Illegality, publicness and conscientiousness/specified purposes
Participating in a civil disobedience movement is illegal. Illegality is to violate
the law by acting or not acting accordingly. However, participating in civil
disobedience is not equal to law-breaking generally. Law-breaking behavior can be
done out of different motivations. The participants of civil disobedience have to
follow certain restrictions on the purpose of their breaking of a law, to distinguish
themselves from other law-breakers like criminals. So, under what purpose(s), can
participants of civil disobedience be distinct from other criminals?
In the minimalist definition above, civil disobedience must be conscientiously
with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, policies, or decisions of the government
(Bedau, 1961, p. 661). And, in the maximalist definition, the requirements around the
purpose are also higher. The civil disobedience as a means of protest “…must be
viewed as an exercise in public moral education, as a tactic to achieve law reform…”
(Bedau, 1991, p. 7). So, the purpose of civil disobedience is to change the unjust law
or to educate or awaken an indifferent public to the imperatives of the issue.
The purpose is then highly related to another element, the publicness. You have
to let others know - or even let the government know what you are doing – and,
through the acts, you have to persuade them that you are in the right side. Especially
if you are doing something illegal, you have to convince the public by doing that
openly, being willing to accept criticism and being ready for discussion (and
normally ready for bearing the cost of law-breaking). That’s the process of moral
education.

because there have been many celebrities, pre- and current legislative councilors who have been their
guest. One can see the table “Summary of Citizens’ Radio Incident” for more detail.
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Before examining the purpose of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, the behavior of
the participants should be first gone through, to see if it was illegal and public. The
participants of the Citizens’ Radio Incident have largely been included in the
following behaviors: possessing the equipment for radio broadcasting, setting up the
equipment for radio broadcasting, broadcasting and being a guest in the programs.
Except being a guest, the above acts are illegal under the Telecommunications
Ordinance. According to the Section (8)(1) of the Telecommunication Ordinance, no
person shall:
(a) Establish or maintain any means of telecommunications; or
(aa) offer in the course of business a telecommunications service; or
(b) Possess or use any apparatus for radio communications or any apparatus of any kind that
generates and emits radio waves notwithstanding that the apparatus is not intended for
radio communications; or
(c) Deal in the course of trade or business in apparatus or material for radio communications
or in any component part of any such apparatus or in apparatus of any kind that generates
and emits radio waves whether or not the apparatus is intended, or capable of being used,
for radio communications; or
(d) Demonstrate, with a view to sale in the course of trade or business, any apparatus or
material for radio communications. (Department of Justice, 2012)

All of the above acts are not allowed except when a license is “…granted by
the Governor in Council or with the appropriate license granted or created by the
Authority…” (Department of Justice, 2012). So, the acts of possessing any apparatus
for radio broadcasting, setting up and broadcasting (or emitting the radio waves) are
illegal under this law.

44

The acts should be first counted as illegal for the act to be civil disobedience.
However, what’s worth mentioning is that, when the author conducted interviews
with the participants, the point of “illegality” was not directly admitted. Here is the
direct quotation of the interview49:
“Interviewer: So, do you have any definition for civil disobedience?
Interviewee: I don’t have. No definition indeed, but real civil disobedience is ‘when you are
not satisfied with the present institution or law, you have to think of a way, to challenge. And
when you are trying to challenge that, continuously, you are doing so.
Interviewer: Continuously violate the law?
Interviewee: No, it is continuously walking a fine line 50. Then, you are doing (real) civil
disobedience” (Tsang, 2013)

Maybe the reason why interviewee disagreed the acts as illegal is they disagree
with the law. From the above text, “taking part in civil disobedience which was
illegal” has not been directly admitted by Tsang. But rather he used a phrase which is
much vaguer, “walking a fine line”. The author does not want to guess the intention
behind this difference but rather focus on the acts. The author would point to the fact
that the Citizens’ Radio was an illegal act before the judicial branch abolishes the
law.
Then, the next question would be if that the act was “public”. As discussed in
Section 2.3.1, there are two ways to understand the word “public”. First of all, an act
should be related to some public values and public life. Secondly, it should be
established whether the act was carried out openly or done secretly. In this respect,

49

From my interview conducted in Chinese, with Tsang Kin-shing on 16th October, 2013.
The words used by Tsang were “踩鋼線”. The translation above may not be perfectly accurate. But
the phrase is learnt from http://paper.wenweipo.com/2012/03/30/ED1203300029.htm.
50

45

the statement of the Citizens’ Radio has a clear stance. It was aiming at freedom of
speech, which is a public value we treasure (The Citizens' Radio, 2006). Also, the
intention to launch civil disobedience had been clearly stated in the newspapers even
before Tsang went to submit the application to the authority - obviously not a secret
(Sing Tao Daily, 2005)
So, we come to an important distinction of civil disobedience - the purpose.
The purpose of the law-breaking act is crucial to justifying the acts or even when
making a claim that a civil disobedience movement is being performed. The author
admits that there may be no universal agreement on the definition of civil
disobedience, so the purpose is important element to convince others your
disobedience is civil. And for a civil disobedience to be justified, the purpose should
not be that of private interest or at least not be presented as that of private interest.
What was the purpose of the Citizens’ Radio incident? We can first examine
the content of their stance statement. In the statement, it was put that the aim of their
act was to strike for “…freedom of speech…” (The Citizens' Radio, 2006). In my
interview with the Director, Tsang Kin-shing, there is more elaboration:
“Every day’s broadcast is challenging the law.”

Also from the quotation before:
“… real civil disobedience is ‘when you are not satisfied with the present institution or law, you
have to think of a way, to challenge. …”

So, according to Tsang, the aim of setting up the Citizens’ Radio was to
challenge the law or present institutions (Tsang, 2013). In fact, this aim has a little bit
divergence with the definition posed by Bedau. This is because, according to the
minimalist definition, it should be the law, policy or a decision made by the
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government that is to be challenged. However, Tsang was not only aiming at the law
but also the licensing institution. This viewpoint is not only shared by one participant.
In the author’s interview with Legislator Leung Kwok-hung, a similar
viewpoint has been expressed:
“Interviewee: We think that the Telecommunication Ordinance is wrong and we knew that we
have to apply for a license. But we deliberately broadcast without a license, and let them sue
us. …
Interviewer: Your aim is to change the law?
Interviewee: To change the institution.” (Leung K.-h. , 2013)

The aim, to change the institution, is not included in the definition of Bedau.
But does this mean that the acts above were not civil disobedience, or can the
definition of civil disobedience be changed to include the aim “to change the
institution”? This thesis would incline towards the view of regarding the acts of the
participants of the Citizens’ Radio as civil disobedience. This stance can be
explained below.
The law related to telecommunications quoted above included a premise. When
a license was “…granted by the Governor in Council or with the appropriate license
granted or created by the Authority…”, the broadcast made with that apparatus was
not illegal (Department of Justice, 2012). So, in fact, the institution for license
granting is included as part of the law. To change the institution for license granting
is in fact changing the law.
Also, the “institution” they aim at is not government as a whole. (But if so,
that’s certainly a revolution, not a civil disobedience movement) So, the author of
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this thesis would claim the above acts still falling within the theoretical framework
built.
Although the aim shared by the participants is not exactly the same with the
requirement of the minimalist definition, we find a strong moral judgment in their
words. What they were doing was for moral education - the language of “right or
wrong” had been employed by the activists. For example, in my interview with
Leung Kwok-hung, he claimed:
“We think that the Telecommunication Ordinance is wrong…”
“The way to do civil disobedience is to reject an unreasonable ordinance, to oppose a nonsense
institution or a nonsense police order” (Leung K.-h. , 2013)

So, after examining the legality, publicness and the purpose of the incident, we
can claim that it does fit our comprehensive definition of civil disobedience. The
next section will cover the remaining element - nonviolence.
3.1.2 Nonviolence
The criterion, to be nonviolent, is easy to claim but hard to evaluate. The
problem is “what act(s) should be counted as nonviolent and what shouldn’t”. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the element nonviolence itself controversial. Morreall
challenged the concept of nonviolence by stating that “…there are many acts of
violence done to people in which no physical contact is ever made…” (Morreall,
1976). In other words, whether only physical harm should be counted as violence is
the point to grapple with. And if not only physical harm should be counted as
violence, what more?
Morreall added that violence may be the violation of man’s rights to ‘life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and that’s why harm to one’s property and
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psychological harm should also be counted (Morreall, 1976). Excepting the
viewpoint of pacifists,51 “…most of the philosophers who have written on the subject,
[accept that] the decision whether to act violently emerges as a tactical, not a
principled, matter…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 8). So, it is possible for us to consider the
problem of nonviolence from a tactical perspective, rather than from a principled
perspective.
If we follow the tactical perspective, whether a movement, or its “final
expression”,52 is presented as nonviolent is the salient question. In this vein, the
Citizens’ Radio Incident is nonviolent because what they have been doing is to
broadcast in the air, using 102.8FM to launch their civil disobedience movement
(The Citizens' Radio, 2006). It is quite hard for us to link this act with violence - if
violence is strictly defined as to physically harm somebody. However, for the sake of
precision, the author is obliged to show the complexity of the issue. So, in another
vein, we might mention that 102.8FM is occupied (or assigned by government) by
another radio broadcasting station, Metro Broadcasting Corporation Limited (Hong
Kong Economic Journal, 2005). Also, there is some debate as to whether the act of
occupying the frequency might endanger the take-off and landing of airplanes (Ta
Kung Pao, 2008). So, if we follow the strictest sense of nonviolence, the Citizens’
Radio Incident should be counted as violent. However, the author of this thesis
would rather be lenient and follow the common definition of violence, which is to do
physical harm. So, the author would regard the movement as a nonviolent initiative.

It is debatable to use ‘pacifist’ to describe Mahatma Gandhi. As shown in George Orwell’s
Reflections on Gandhi, the “anti-humanist tendency” of Gandhi’s belief is incompatible with that of
the Western pacifists (Orwell, 1961, p. 454).
52
See Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.1), from (Rawls, 1971, p. 106)
51

49

To enhance the solidarity of this claim, the interviews tested whether the social
activists launching the movement followed the notion of nonviolence. A veteran
social activist, Tsang Kin-shing emphasized in the interview:
“Civil disobedience is not to hurt another physically… I have to clarify that the League of
Social Democrats (LSD) has no inclination to violence. … It is we that suffered more from
violence - rather than acting that on others.” (Tsang, 2013)53

It is clear that Tsang, the Director of the Citizens’ Radio, clearly knows the
importance of nonviolence in launching a civil disobedience movement. As he
defined nonviolence as “not to hurt another physically”, we can see the intention
upon launching the civil disobedience movement was not to harm others physically
(Tsang, 2013). At the very least, the movement itself and the intentions of the
movement leaders were not violent.
The theoretical complexity of nonviolence has been shown before but, in
practice, it is also difficult to stand firm on not being violent.
Another experienced activist, Lau San-ching54 claimed:
“Nonviolence… practically speaking is to not to harm the opposite side, just like not to throw
petrol bomb, not to throw stone… But when you slide on the track of train, police has to come
to remove you. At this moment, there must be physical conflict, which is unavoidable. …
When you are doing civil disobedience, you have to disobey his command. So, you won’t leave
actively, he/she is forced to remove you. … But in Hong Kong, some may regard sitting on
street or even to have that kind of physical conflict with police, as a kind of violence.” (Lau S.c. , 2013)55

Author’s interview conducted in Chinese, with Tsang Kin-shing on 16th October, 2013.
He returned to the Mainland in 1981, to try and save the democratic activist, Wang Xi-zhe. He
failed and was sentenced to ten years. He came back to Hong Kong in 1991 (Hong Kong Economic
Journal, 2009).
55
Author’s interview conducted in Chinese, with Lau San-ching on 24th October, 2013.
53
54
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As shown in the above text, Lau claimed that, in practice, those performing
civil disobedience movement cannot avoid being accused of violence. The final
impression is not a business initiators can fully control. Even if you don’t throw
petrol bombs or throw stones, you may just decide to occupy train tracks. The police
may command you to leave, you might disobey their order and then they would have
to remove you. In the process of removal, you might try to stop the process or avoid
pain by struggling. Police may be hurt by you through this action. Then, in some
eyes, that may also be seen as violent.
However, in the author’s view, it seems to be too strict to claim that the people
sitting on tracks and waiting for removal are violent. So, although the above
quotation may show Lau’s real life experience, it is hard to classify such acts as
violent if we hold to our standard of violence as harming someone physically. Maybe
we have to consider the intention further, but that might be too much. We can stick to
the “final expression” of the whole movement as the key pointer as to whether it is
violent.
So, no matter whether considered in theory or in practice, nonviolence is a
slippery concept. The standard is controversial. The participants of civil disobedience
movement can just keep their behavior as nonviolent as possible (let’s say to not
harm somebody physically), and let the audience decide whether they are or not. This
is related to our discussion on “final expression”.
Nonviolence is still one of the criteria to be assessed for a movement to be
claimed as civil disobedience. The debate is just about whether it is finally expressed
as nonviolent. That is partly a function of the media coverage and which sides of the
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arguments have been presented to the public.56 There are more factors affecting the
final expression but, largely speaking, civil disobedience movement has to be
nonviolent. In this regard, the author of this thesis would incline to the view that the
Citizens’ Radio Incident was a nonviolent movement.
As a whole, the Citizens’ Radio Incident has suited our comprehensive version
of the definition, so it can be included as a civil disobedience movement in Hong
Kong. The following is a summary of factual data and analysis of the movement’s
emergence.

56

The images shown to the public, and how they are received, is definitely an important factor
affecting the final expression of a movement. One case to note is Bull Connor’s decision to oppress
the demonstrators in Birmingham with fire hoses and police dogs. It was well shot and horrified
Americans (PBS, 2006). It was crucial to the whole impression the civil rights movement conveyed to
the public.
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Event

Organizers

Celebrities’

OFTA / Police Arrest?

Prosecution?

N/A

N/A

N/A

Citizens’

-

Raymond Wong

No

N/A

Radio

-

Lam Yuk Wah

Citizens’

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes – 2006. 08. 29, 10. 13

Yes – 2006. 11. 16, 12. 09

participation
2005. 09
Formally applied for a license from

Citizens’
Radio

BA57
2005. 10. 03
1st Broadcast (1 hour)
2005. 10. 06
Applied for trial-broadcast from BA58
2006. 07. 28

57
58

Radio

Citizens’

(The Citizens' Radio, 2006)
(Sing Tao Daily, 2005, p. A20)
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The Statement on Open the airwave

Radio

and 10. 18

to the public
2007. 04. 20
Broadcast at Mongkok

Citizens’

-

Long Hair59

Yes – 2007. 07. 16, on the

Radio

-

Lam Yuk-wah60

guest63

-

Tsang Kin-shing61

-

RTHK trade union

Yes – 2007. 07. 3164

rep.62
2007. 05. 25
Broadcast (topic June 4th)

Citizens’

-

Long Hair65

Radio

-

Szeto Wah66

59

(Metro Hong Kong, 2007, p. P06)
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
(Sing Pao Daily News, 2007a, p. A08)
65
(Sing Pao Daily News, 2007b, p. A08)
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
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Yes

Yes – 2007. 11. 1967

2008. 01. 10
Broadcast

Citizens’

-

Cheung Chiu-hung68 Yes

Yes – 2008. 01. 1274

Radio

-

Lee Wing-tak69

(contumacy)

-

Albert Chan Waiyip70

-

Long Hair71

-

Emily Lau72

-

Lee Cheuk-yan73

Table 1 Summary of Citizens’ Radio Incident

68

(The Sun, 2008, p. A06)
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
(Government News, 2008)
69
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3.2 Why did the Citizens’ Radio Incident emerge?
To explain the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, the author of this
thesis has found a multi-faceted explanation. This explanation has been found
through interviews with the participants of the incident. Their views have been
generalized into a few factors. They are the institutional deficits, a stronger
constitutional ground, the existence of delegitimizing event and the cleavage within
the Democratic Party.
3.2.1 Institutional deficits
‘Institutional deficits’ means that, except through civil disobedience,
institutional or lawful ways to change the law were not feasible. Institutional or
lawful ways, for instance, might be through the legislative branch, through the
judicial branch, or through lawful protest. This viewpoint resembles the second
condition raised by John Rawls when he was discussing the justification for civil
disobedience (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2).
To examine the possibility of a legislator changing a law in council, we can
first start with an examination of the related articles in the Basic Law. According to
the Article 74,
“Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may
introduce bills in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which
do not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government may
be introduced individually or jointly by members of the Council. The written consent of the
Chief Executive shall be required before bills relating to government policies are introduced.”
(HKSAR, 2012)

This article weakens, if not castrates, the power of an individual member to
change the government’s policy proactively. If every bill related to public
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expenditure and political structure cannot be introduced and the written consent of
the Chief Executive is needed for every bill related to government policies, what
power still remains in the hands of the legislators? So, the chance to change a law
through the introducing of a bill is hindered - if not terminated.
And if the legislator is lucky enough to launch a bill proactively in order to
change the targeted law, would it be possible for the resulting amendment to be
passed? According to Annex II of the Basic Law, the procedures for voting on bills
and motions are largely confined. According to the Section II of the Annex,
“Unless otherwise provide for in this Law, the Legislative Council shall adopt the following
procedures for voting on bills and motions:
The passage of bills introduced by the government shall require at least a simple majority vote
of the members of the Legislative Council present.
The passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual
members of the Legislative Council shall require a simple majority vote of each of the two
groups of members present: members returned by functional constituencies and those returned
by geographical constituencies through direct elections and by Election Committee.” (HKSAR,
2012)

The above “separation of vote” arrangement is hindering, if not by intention,
the passage of any motion, bill or amendment proposed by a legislator - no matter
from which geographical constituency or in which functional constituency.
The same idea is shared by an interviewee, when he was explaining why he did
not seek to change the law via the Legislative Council:
“There are about 30% (of the defendants in this case), which are or were legislators, out of the
total number of defendants which is around 30. We think that under the present political
structure, being a legislator cannot attain our aim. This is because under the undemocratic
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setting, the members of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong
Kong (DAB) or the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) will for sure oppose it.”
(Tsang, 2013)

And he went on to elucidate what “undemocratic setting” means:
“The voice of the citizens, despite having more votes in total, cannot be represented in the
number of seats.
Also, with the separation of vote, it is very hard to change a law” (Tsang, 2013)

However, we can examine how strong the relationship of this factor and the
emergence of the movement was in the following way. One may argue that, if the
Legislative branch has been weakened by the Basic Law, why didn’t the Citizens’
Radio Incident emerge right after 1997?
That’s the main point this thesis would like to stress. Although the similar
argument is common and stated by my interviewee, author of this thesis would not
regard this factor as the sufficient condition. It is because this is a subjective feeling
for initiators to feel that “legal/normal ways proved to be no avail”. There would be
some conditions pre-existing causing these subjective feelings. So, though this
condition was mentioned by my interviewee, it can be treated as a favorable
condition (which lessens cost/raise benefit of launching collective movement) only
but not sufficient condition. In other words, those favorable conditions may enhance
the convincingness of the acts (or may even draw more attention or raise
participation rate), but not stimulate the immediate emergence of the acts. This
question will be answered in section 4.2.3 the existence of delegitimizing event.
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3.2.2 Stronger constitutional ground
To change law in the judicial branch, a decision made by the judges favoring
the change has to be sought. That means winning a lawsuit in the courts. To change
the law in the courts, one depends on the proactive launching of a judicial review or
winning the case as the defendant(s) of a lawsuit. In the courts, what is being
weighed is the legal viewpoint. In other words, it is the legality of the arguments
being weighed that matters and other arguments are not considered. So, before one
tries to change a law through the judicial branch, one has to think of the validity of
the legal grounds of their argument.
To check a law’s legality, the constitutionality of it is a crucial starting point. In
the pre-1997 era, the Letter Patent and the Royal Instructions were documents
supporting the rule of the colonial government, rather than constitutional documents
stating the rights citizens enjoyed and confining the power of the government. So, the
legal grounds for one to test the constitutionality of a law were limited. But, after the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (HKBORO) took effect in June 1991, important
legal grounds for people to challenge preexisting laws in Hong Kong were laid75
(Tam, 2013). This environment was bolstered further after 1st July 1997 when a
“constitution” was introduced which could provide further constitutional grounds.
From time to time, there has been evidence showing that the Basic Law
functions as an important instrument that helps activists show their legitimacy when
challenging the law. After the first prosecution of Tsang and Leung in 2007, Leung
made this claim in the court:

75

The HKBORO largely replicates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
It is a higher law than any preexisting law in Hong Kong and if any law in Hong Kong is contrary to
the HKBORO, the courts are “responsible for enforcing the HKBORO”.
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“The Citizens’ Radio is just founded by a group of people who wish to voice out their opinion
via radio broadcasting, their acts are in accordance to the Basic Law, the Bill of Rights and the
International Covenant.”76 (Hong Kong Daily News, 2007)

The author would argue that it is an important consideration of activists
whether to use judicial review or civil disobedience77. This was admitted by one
interviewee, Leung Kwok-hung, when he said:
“In the time of the Colonial era, there is no constitution. But since we have the Hong Kong Bill
of Rights Ordinance (HKBORO) in 1992, we have a stronger legal basis though this is not a
constitutional base. The ordinance can provide more solid legal ground when we want to
challenge the law we aim at. …
This provides a better argument in courts when we are doing civil disobedience” 78 (Leung K.h. , 2013)

And he kept on explaining what the difference was in launching a civil
disobedience movement before and after 1997:
“Before hand-over, there were civil disobedience movements, but at the time, we don’t even
have a chance to have hearing (in courts)” (Leung K.-h. , 2013).

One has to understand that those taking part in a civil disobedience movement
have to prepare for going to jail. But before being sent there, participants have to be
judged by the Court to ascertain their guilt. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine the
strong relationship between the independence of the courts and the likeliness of a
widespread civil disobedience movement. Not all of the participants of civil

Author’s own translation.
When considering whether to use judicial review or civil disobedience, it has been admitted by one
of my interviewees, Leung Kwok-hung that, “…there is not much difference. We can do both. But for
sure, civil disobedience can arouse more attention, because of its nature as a mass movement…”
(Leung K.-h. , 2013).
78
Although my interviewee was talking about why the Anti-POO demonstration emerged, the author
of this thesis thinks that it is still applicable in the case of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, as a similar
civil disobedience to be launched.
76
77
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disobedience movement can “enjoy” their jail time like Gandhi, but they will
consider the likeliness of being jailed and the likeliness of winning a lawsuit in court
once they are prosecuted.
So, similar considerations to the above discussion of the constitutional grounds
provided by the HKBORO and the Basic Law have indeed encouraged protagonists
to launch civil disobedience movement. It is because the constitutional/legal grounds
may act as a catalyst to the mass movement in return. In other words, the movement
may have a larger chance of getting the blessings of the court if stronger legal
grounds are provided by some ordinances or the constitution. On the other hand, if
there is no possibility of winning a lawsuit in court, will people still risk their life or
resources to bring themselves to lawsuits or even jail? It is harder - if not impossible.
That’s maybe the reason why, before the establishment of HKBORO and/or the
Basic Law, civil disobedience had not been consciously employed as a strategy
(comparing the cases included later, the Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident with To
Kwan-hang’s civil disobedience in 1992; the latter, as a conscious employment of the
strategy, had been partly encouraged by the establishment of the HKBORO). Here,
the author wants to show that the lack of constitutional grounds hinders, if not
terminates the emergence of civil disobedience movements.
So, once again, stronger constitutional grounds (this time, with the support of
the HKBORO and/or the Basic Law) did not stimulate the immediate emergence of
civil disobedience, but did act as a favorable condition. It encouraged the activists to
employ the means as they knew that they would have stronger legal grounds even if
they were caught and prosecuted.
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3.2.3 The Emergence of Delegitimizing Event
What is then be counted as the sufficient condition? The delegitimizing event,
author calls it, this is the most direct and the most emphasized point that my
interviewee provided when he explained why the Citizens’ Radio Incident emerged.
The Citizens’ Radio emerged with an event, which this thesis calls the Delegitimizing
Event, in 2004. The event was the Censorship of Albert Cheng Jing-han and
Raymond Wong Yuk-man (Censorship on Cheng and Wong) (Apple Daily, 2004).
The importance of this event is out of expectation of the author. To illustrate, it
has to show the origin of the idea to set-up a radio broadcast station. In interview,
Tsang Kin-shing claimed:
“In fact, I was planning to set-up a radio station called the Citizens’ Radio in about 1996 or 1997.
It is because I was worrying the Rule of the Communist Party in Hong Kong after the handover.
Our freedom of speech was going to be restricted and oppressed. So, at the time, I was forming a
group to launch this station.” (Tsang, 2013)

Tsang went on to explain why the Citizens’ Radio had not emerged in 1996,
but rather in 2005:
“However, when we were still in honeymoon, still feeling that 1995/96 was the golden era and
the full blossom of Cheng and Wong, there was no problem. But suddenly, when they were
censored, I was then awakened. I started to think that it cannot be waited for longer. However, it
had been delayed for 9 years.” (Tsang, 2013)

He tried to explain his viewpoint on the nature of their censorship:
“At the time of 2005, Cheng and Wong were holding a level of audience at 5 hundred to 6
hundred thousand. Still, there is no one who can catch up. Commercial Radio Hong Kong
(CRHK) is a commercial organization which should aim at profit. Why would you censor your
most-popular commentators? It has to be a political consideration.” (Tsang, 2013)
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It was this “political consideration” that made Tsang think that it was
imperative to launch a Citizens’ Radio to safeguard freedom of speech. Freedom of
speech, as an important corner stone of development of Hong Kong, is one of the
general beliefs or values mentioned while we were discussing the element
contributing to legitimacy. When government acts against these values,
government’s legitimacy would be harmed.
In this case, censorship on Cheng and Wong had alarmed Tsang Kin-shing, on
his concern that freedom of speech he treasures would be harmed. The censorship
would in return harmed government’s legitimacy and also, enhanced the legitimacy
of the acts protecting the value above. So, this time, the censorship on Cheng and
Wong acted as a sufficient condition in the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident
as a kind of civil disobedience movement. It stimulated its emergence and its
emergence was the immediate product of the stimulus.
3.2.4 Cleavage within the Democratic Party
This last factor is relatively indirect when compared to the previous two.
However, this factor, the cleavage between the social activist(s) the author
interviewed and the “traditional” Democrats, is emphasized when explaining why
some means were used at certain points in time.
The cleavage between Tsang Kin-shing, as a “Young Turk” and other
democrats in the Democratic Party is well-known. However, this thesis is not going
to study their personal relationship, but to focus on how this cleavage helped
constitute the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident.
The cleavage was discussed in interview with Tsang:
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“In 1996, they, the good-for-nothing, challenged the Provisional Legislative Council just with
gathering signature on streets. We also gathered signature, but we brought the signatures to
Beijing and directly went to Lu Ping79. We asked for an instant shut-down of the Provisional
Legislative Council.” (Tsang, 2013)

The differences between Tsang and the other democrats were emphasized
during interview, mainly when discussing the innovativeness of means and ideology.
Firstly, on innovativeness of means:
“The most important thing lied with the change on the institution. For this, I have thought of a
lot of ways different from the traditional one. Those ‘old’ Democrats, they were coming from
schools, only known how to denounce by tongue and pen, protest and demonstrate. The most
extreme case is just hunger strike and protest with letter written in blood. That’s it, no more.
We are different. We stick with ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’. You can call it
‘radical’, but we are not aiming to hurt other’s lives even though we are radical” (Tsang, 2013)

The setting-up of a Citizens’ Radio also constituted a difference of means:
“In the transition period of handover, Uncle Wah (Seto Wah) told us that it will be a harsh
winter. He urged us to prepare our own resource to go through this severe winter which might
last long. So, I told them I was planning to set-up a Citizens’ Radio and I had raised some
money. However, gossip outburst. There were some people in our party attack me and saying
that the money raised was for my own spending. They even claimed that the money raised was
for my gambling on horse racing and spent seven hundred thousand for each game. I replied
‘that is insane’” (Tsang, 2013)

This highlighted that the means Tsang advocated was not supported by the
majority of his colleagues in the Democratic Party. As one might imagine, if a means
is not recognized and supported by colleagues, it will either be postponed or carried

79

Lu Ping was the Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office.
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out with like-minded colleagues. This related to the Young Turks of the party and
their ideology. Tsang describes the Young Turks in this way:
“It is because of the minimium wage, which is the Young Turks’ belief. We thought that we
should have it. Young Turks included Gary Fan Kwok-wai, Andrew Cheng Ka-fu. However,
they are not on the same front with us. They stayed in the party, but Andrew To Kwan-hang,
Chan Kwok-leung and I were out immediately.” (Tsang, 2013)

This fragmentation within the Democratic Party did not start the Citizens’
Radio immediately, but gathered like-mind Young Turks together for future
development. So, the differences of means and ideology did not directly contribute to
the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio, but more or less encouraged the emergence of
the Citizens’ Radio. One can imagine that, if Tsang had stayed in the same party, his
decision to launch a Citizens’ Radio might have been hindered even if the
“delegitimizing event” had happened, due to the lack of party support with resources
and like-mind companions. So, the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio had been
encouraged by the cleavage.80 And, coincidently, the change of electoral method in
2000 may need to be taken into consideration when considering the fragmentation.81
This cleavage acted as a favorable condition, but not sufficient condition. The
differences of ideology and party line gathered the like-minded Young Turks
together. Whether this gathering also attracted resources supporting the
establishment of the Citizens’ Radio is unknown, but what is known is this gathering
encouraged them to employ new means which were banned before. The employment

Note that here the author doesn’t want to claim that it was “caused” by the cleavage - as it is really
hard to know whether it was the different thought on means that caused the cleavage or vice versa.
81
See (Ma & Choy, 1999). It has generalized the relationship between the evolution of the electoral
system and party politics - from 1991 as more pluralistic, to 1995 more polarized and to 1998 more
fragmented (Ma & Choy, 1999, p. 285). Also, the intra-camp competition within the pro-democracy
camp was more vigorous than that of the pro-PRC camp at the time (Ma & Choy, 1999, p. 304).
80
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of civil disobedience may be one such means in the list, but it still had to wait for the
sufficient condition for its emergence.

66

3.3 Chapter Summary
In fact, we can simplify the above discussion within the perspective of
justifiability and stimulus. The first factor, the institutional deficit (or one can call it
Legislative deficit), is about the justifiability of the acts (civil disobedience) in the
eyes of others - as it is easy to question “whether there is no other way out”. It would
be favorable to the acts if the institutional deficit was obvious in the eyes of others.
The second factor, the stronger constitutional grounds, is a positive indicator of
the justifiability of the movement. If the stance had stronger legal/constitutional
grounds, it may have a larger impact on the public and help change their views on the
movement. Also, it may encourage the activists to risk their freedom to pursue the
collective goal(s). The stronger the constitutional grounds, the more favorable the
condition was.
The third factor was the existence of delegitimizing event. This is the most
direct factor that immediately affected not only the justifiability but also stimulated
the emergence of civil disobedience movement. In the author’s view, we can
understand the mechanism via the nature of this special way of protest. As civil
disobedience, in Bedau’s words, is a process of moral education, when people
experience some issue that greatly “delegitimize” the opposite side, the moral
grounds of the civil disobedience are enhanced and the illegal acts are more
convincing and become legitimate. This factor can be emphasized and reexamined
with the following case.
The last factor was the cleavage within the Democratic Party. This seems to be
a specific factor of the Citizens’ Radio Incident only. But, indeed, we can link it with
the first factor. As the “traditional” democrats in this case represented the moderate
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side (compared with civil disobedience) which emphasized lawful protest and other
institutional means, the cleavage just encouraged the “radicals” to look for noninstitutional/traditional ways of protest. It was, again, a favorable condition to the
emergence of civil disobedience.
To sum up, the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident was encouraged by
many factors and stimulated by the delegitimizing effect (in this case the censorship
of Cheng and Wong). The institutional deficits, stronger constitutional grounds and
the cleavage are favorable conditions. The delegitimizing effect is sufficient condition.
These factors are not yet well-organized and not yet able to be inferred from other
cases in Hong Kong. But the generalization of the stimulating factors will be the
work of the last chapter. In the following chapter, the conditions generalized from
interviews will be posed first and subsequently analyzed.
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Chapter 4 Anti-Public Order Ordinance (POO)
Demonstrations
Another series of civil disobedience movement in Hong Kong was directed
against the Public Order Ordinance. This law originated from the Summary Offence
Ordinance and, being passed in 1967, swiftly provided a legal basis to oppress the
riot (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994, p. 8). This law was not abandoned
after the 1967 Riot and was used for restraining the social movements of the 1970s.82
Even in 1971, the places designated for lawful assembly were restricted to only five
and the power to restrict assemblies beforehand and to terminate assemblies instantly
was given to police inspectors and higher ranks (Hong Kong Federation of Students,
1994, p. 8). Conflict escalated throughout the 1970s. Then, the tight restriction on the
number of participants that constituted an illegal assembly was slightly loosened in
1980 (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994, p. 8). During the 1970s, civil
disobedience was not used as a strategy to expand the rights of citizens. However, in
1979 the Yau Ma Tei (YMT) Boat People Incident emerged as a civil disobedience
movement suiting the minimalist definition,83 in the sense that the means (civil
disobedience) was not consciously employed to frustrate the law, but merely as a
similar reaction with some of the characteristics of the special way of protest.

4.1 Minimalist Civil Disobedience: 1979 Yau Ma Tei Boat-People
Incident
Minimalist civil disobedience will be used to describe the incident in 1979, the
Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident, due to the fact that it had certain qualities of civil
82

For the employment of the law on restraining social movements, see (Hong Kong Federation of
Students, 1994, p. 20).
83
Defined as “…something that serves to illustrate the typical qualities of a class; model; exemplar…”
or “…the original or model on which something is based or formed…” (Dictionary.com, 2014).
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disobedience, but not all of them – that of the maximalist definition.84 This is
because if one is to use an action for moral education, the means has to be
consciously employed as a strategy. In this case, it was not. So, let’s see what
happened and why the author calls it a minimalist civil disobedience, but not simply
civil disobedience.
4.1.1 Origin: Why had it been “an incident”?
Before the incident broke out, the living environments of the boat people had
been a social problem. Within the Yau Ma Tei Typhoon Shelter, there were a lot of
boat-people who used to fish and also lived on the boats. However, when the fishing
boats were worn out, they lost their way to earn a living. So, they needed to work
onshore. But, still, they lived on the boats - for two reasons: Firstly, the wage they
earned from their labor was too low to pay for the rent of private tenements.
Secondly, they had to wait a long time to qualify to live in public housing (Chan S.h. , 2007, p. 46). And for various reasons85, more and more boat-people moored their
boats in the typhoon shelter. Their living conditions got worse. It was common for
children to fall into the sea and for the boats to catch on fire. The hygiene conditions
were also bad and people living there found it hard to access medical treatment due
to transportation problems. Not to mention a lack of electricity (The Hong Kong
University Students' Union, 1978, pp. 6-7). 86 These marginalized fishers attracted a
lot of attention from the wider public. However, those who really got known what

84

For detail, see the end of section 1.2.1 in Chapter 1.
According to the investigation carried out by the Concern Group of the University of Hong Kong,
most of the boat-people living in the typhoon shelter were the “weed-out” - eliminated from the
industry by machinery fishing, fishers from other regions, pollution from industrialization and the
attractiveness of onshore jobs (The Hong Kong University Students' Union, 1978). So, one can infer
that many of the people staying on the boats were elderly or children - the youngsters and adults
getting occupation onshore.
86
For the general living condition of boat-people, one may see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG81e5t0kVE, which is a video shot by RTHK on the history of
Aberdeen Typhoon Shelter.
85
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was really happening and gave a helping hand, were students and newly emerged
“pressure groups” that got onto the boats (Chan S.-h. , 2013). Being one of the
participants, Chan Shun-hing remembers that:
“…we, as a volunteer, were introduced by Gam Chai (甘仔)87 to have acquaintance with those
boat-people who sought help as their boat sunk. Boat-sunk is not only about losing a place for
living, but all of they have, even their lives. …In avoidance of boat-sunk, they will tie their
boats up. However, the fire may burn them out altogether…” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, pp. 47-48).88

Under these severe conditions, the people’s demands of getting onshore
intensified and their works were more organized by mid-1977 (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p.
49). Chan illustrated:
“Besides us, a group of volunteers, the relatively progressive social workers from the Society
for Community Organization (SOCO) … also get to the boats, visit them and to help them
registered, as a collective movement to demand from the government” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p.
49).

Their protests intensified from 1977 to 1979. Chan Shun-hing mentioned in her
interview:
“The activity was escalated continuously, initially the Housing Department, later the Chief
Secretary’s Office and finally the Government House” (Chan S.-h. , 2013).

The place was getting near to the center of colonial rule for sure, but also their
way of protest created some fear in the government. On 16 Sept 1977, there were two
hundred boat-people carrying a broken boat to the Chief Secretary’s Office (Chan S.h. , 2007, p. 48). The author doesn’t know if their intention was to draw the focus of
media but, in fact, they did just that. Chan Shun-hing recalled that “…we called the
That’s Priest Franco Mella who had strived for the social welfare and basic human rights of the
minority in Hong Kong.
88
All quotations of this source are my own translations from Chinese.
87
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reporters when we had any protest…” (Chan S.-h. , 2013). Another symbolized
protest was:
“…in April, there was a child fallen into the sea and died. … As a response, a group of
progressive social workers prepared a small funeral and all dressed in black, and marched to
the Housing Department. We, for sure, had not applied license from government. We had not
been arrested, but been warned that ‘we (police) reserved the rights to arrest you’. For sure, this
had not become true, because we were not boat-people, but social workers who were much
stronger…” (Chan S.-h. , 2013).

On 7 Jan 1979, the boat people were arrested while on the way to the
Government House. This has been called as an “incident” as it aroused a lot of
concern, especially since most of them were elderly or children, but still charged
with illegal assembly. So, this arrest aroused public interest not only in the boatpeople but also the law about an era of riots. This interesting mechanism was
remarked upon by Chan Shun-hing:
“In fact, we had not applied for the license for demonstrations for years. If the police was
strictly following the law, why wouldn’t they arrest us in many previous times? The sudden
implementation of the law would have another consideration behind, we speculate that’s just
because the establishment did not want the social movement to develop. Then they chose to
oppress it… However, ridiculously, once they arrested us, the attention was drawn from the
mass, especially on the Public Order Ordinance” (Chan S.-h. , 2013).

As shown below by Figure 1 and 2, the arrest had drawn the media’s attention.
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Figure 2 Sing Tao Daily-1979-1-8

Figure 3 Ming Pao-1979-1-8
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4.1.2 Why is it a “minimalist civil disobedience”?
As shown above, the arrest of the boat-people with the Public Order Ordinance
broke out in 1979, labelled as the so-called Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident. The
problem had lasted for years and the protests demanding reasonable shelter had
escalated and finally ended with the arrest of boat-people and their supporters.
In the following passages, the issue will be looked at closely, to see why it is
not considered only a minimalist civil disobedience. The characteristics of civil
disobedience include nonviolence, publicness, illegality and a will carried out
“conscientiously with the intent to frustrate the laws, polices or decision of
government” (for the minimalist definition) (Bedau, 1961) and as “an exercise in
public moral education” (for the maximalist definition) (Bedau, 1991).
Was the Yau Ma Tei Boat-People Incident violent? It seems not because, even
at the moment when they were arrested for illegal assembly, the participants were
just on trucks heading to Government House. According to the newspaper (Figure 3),
there were 48 ladies, 18 men and 5 children (age ranged from 8 to 65). The report
seems to focus on the wide age-range of the participants involved. It seems that there
was no violent act conducted by these people.
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Figure 4 Sing Tao Daily-1979-1-09

The criteria of “public”, “illegal” and “intention” can be discussed
simultaneously. According to the interview with Chan Shun Hing, throughout the
years they had never applied for any license from the police for any gathering or
assembly. With regard to the warning they received in the demonstration to the
Housing Department at April, she said:
“Before 7th January 1979, we had been warned and even stopped by the police with the Public
Order Ordinance. I remember that should be the Christmas. They said: ‘if you guys don’t apply
for demonstration and go further, we will arrest you.’ … But we had not feared for that. We
would not apply for that just because you said so. This is what we had done for years” (Chan
S.-h. , 2013)

In her book, she described the psychology of the participants:
“Due to the warning of the policemen on 24 th Dec 1978, the participants had prepared that if
they were not going apply permit, the policemen would took action in the following activity as
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a deterrence. But after meeting with the boat-people, we had made a decision: not to apply for
that” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 53).

So, from the above data collected from interview, the psychology of the
participants at the moment was clear. They knew that what they were doing was
illegal. But for the reasons below, they had not applied for license.
1) They knew that the Public Order Ordinance was a law set in the very
moment; it should not be applicable at that place and time.
2) The rights of demonstrations and protests should be a part of civil rights.
3) They had acted similarly for years. Why should the same acts suddenly
become illegal?
Supplementing with a document89 collected by Chan Shun-hing, the rationale
becomes clearer. A supporter participating in the sit-in demonstration outside the
court wrote:
“From the fact that the boat-people has lobbied many departments without any reward, the
government is obviously indifferent to the need of the people. Applying for a license from that,
it is just like ‘asking a tiger for its skin’. We declare: ‘democratic demonstration is our basic
rights, not a rights based on application’.” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 57)

The rationale behind the decision of “not to apply for a license” was rightsrelated. Regarding the implications of this incident, Prof Chan wrote:
“Regarding ‘owning a suitable home’ as a humanistic treatment and rights to protest as a civil
rights were the important implication to the society brought by the boat-people and the
supporters, through their practice. In other words, these practices and demands had shaped the
ideology or the shape of the early-stage civil society of Hong Kong” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 58).

89

Special Issue of the Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident (my own translation) (油麻地艇戶事件特刊)
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It was obviously seen as a process to empower the definition of citizenship and
the participant’s identity as citizens through a claim on rights. It was certainly done
under the sunlight or, in other words, publicly. Also, it was related to the public
indirectly, not only the rights of those boat-people, because everyone in the society
might face the same trouble when they went to protest.
Furthermore, as admitted, they knew that it was illegal. So, why would the
author say that it was not civil disobedience movement at its maximalist level?
What’s the missing element?
The answer lies with the intention.90 Did the incident aim at changing the law?
Did the incident aim at educating the public that the law was illegitimate through the
breaking of it? Consequentially speaking, they did change it?91 But, as claimed by
interviewees, it was not their intention to change it through breaking it. Also, “moral
education” was not in their minds as either a tactic or as an aim. They just thought
that it was irrational to apply for a license. So, they were not really employing civil
disobedience as a protest means. Also, the means we now call civil disobedience was
not in their minds. Prof Chan wrote:
“…at the time, we don’t’ know this decision of ‘noncooperation’ or means should be called
‘civil disobedience’, we just don’t want to comply to their oppression and not satisfied with
those faces of the foreign police officers.” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 58)

It is obvious that the participants in the boat-people incident were not intently
employing a protest means called civil disobedience, but ended up doing something
very similar to the theory of civil disobedience (like nonviolent, public, illegal and
Intention: 1) to frustrate the laws…of his government (minimalist definition);
2) to educate the public what is right (high-end definition)
91
Prof Chan claimed the change on POO (like changing the licensing system to notification system
and expand the limit on the number of participants from 4 people to more than 30 for assembly and 20
for procession) later in 1980, was the result of the YMT (Chan S.-h. , 2013).
90
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conscientiously). What was missing was just the intention behind the law-breaking
acts - that is educating the public via breaking the law. So, the incident fulfilled the
minimalist definition, but not the maximalist definition.
The first92 emergence of civil disobedience was not learnt from books, but a
natural response to oppression based upon faith. As Chan Shun-hing explained:
“…the content of citizenship is not a conceptual thing. It is not only what we learnt from books.
The content is enriched through practice. When you had seen that there is a lot of problem in
the colony shared by many, we started to question the legitimacy of the colonial
government. … The content of citizenship was enriched when more space was given by the
government and more discussions were held…” (Chan S.-h. , 2013).

Without aiming to change the “unjust” law or to educate the public as to the
major goals, the YMT incident had fulfilled some of the characteristics of the
definition (or precisely speaking, it fulfilled the requirement of the minimalist
definition, but not the maximalist definition).
This new emergence of the YMT incident as a minimalist civil disobedience in
Hong Kong, which further development was needed to also fulfil the maximalist
definition (in this sense, what’s lacking was the consciousness to invite the majority
to question the law via deliberately breaking it). From observing the reactions of the
concerned groups, we should be able to see why the means (deliberately breaking the
law) was not employed and why the history of civil disobedience in Hong Kong did
not further develop right after this crucial point.

According to the author’s research, the YMT Incident was the first civil disobedience that happened
in Hong Kong.
92
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4.2 Why did civil disobedience seldom/never emerge in the early-/mid1980s?
It is an interesting question why there was no relatively large-scale civil
disobedience movements following the YMT Incident. This question is important
because the law had been put under a magnesium lamp by the arrest of the boatpeople and the illegitimacy93 of the law had been exposed in some respects by the
actions of the police. However, the following actions of the public/concern groups
were not larger scale civil disobedience movements, but other actions. Why was that?
Before explaining why there was no relatively large scale civil disobedience
challenging the POO, we have to explore what had been done at the time by the
dissenters who thought that the law (POO) was ridiculous.
According to Professor Fung Ho-lup, the Director of the Society for
Community Organization (SOCO) in the 1980s, there were other feasible ways rather
than civil disobedience:
“In fact, civil disobedience, this term, emerged in the late 1980s. That’s about the time of the
June 4th Incident. … In the time of 1979, there were more people discussing on pressure groups.
And for pressure groups, there were lot of ways to attain their goals, like lobbying, policy
advocates and negotiation with government officials. Civil disobedience is just one of the ways,
it was not much discussed at our time…” (Fung H.-l. , 2013)

On the way they had worked to change the unjust law, Fung Ho-lup explained:
“As the law was unjust, the arrest before had aroused some noise. As the Director of SOCO, I
sent this piece of news to all of the international organizations we knew. Later on, when I

The ridiculousness of the law had been questioned. (The author don’t know if the sense of
ridiculousness was wide-spread or not.) Fung Ho-lup remembered that “…our defense counsel asked
the Judge, ‘What if 4 judges went to have lunch together and in their discussion, there are some
public-related issues, is this illegal?’ The Judge answered, ‘By law, it is.’” (Fung H.-l. , 2013)
93
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revealed the secret documents of the colonial government, the document shows that there were
39 organizations in total. They included welfare, international organizations like OXFAM.
These international organizations sent their enquiry to the colonial government on this issue…”
(Fung H.-l. , 2013).

On the results of the above action, Fung Ho-lup added:
“The government knew this is indefensible, as the protests were really peaceful, without
weapons and most of them were just elderly and underprivileged. So on what basis, you need
to charge them. The government knew that they had to change the law. As a result, there was
change of the law which was forced by our acts…” (Fung H.-l. , 2013)

4.2.1 Opening of political system
The absence of civil disobedience movement right after the YMT Incident
cannot be explained just by the absence of terminology or ideas for civil
disobedience. As we have shown, the participants in the YMT Incident also had no
ideas of civil disobedience in mind, but had consequentially done something similar constructed a minimalist civil disobedience. So, why was the choice of not applying
for licenses and holding more and more demonstrations not the response of the
affected groups?
Fung Ho-lup has his explanation:
“No need to confront. The government at the time was relatively open. There were many
small-scale civic groups and pressure groups hoping to discuss certain policy with the officials.
The officials would say yes. Like SOCO, we just had a dozen of people at the time. We can
still reach the Chief Secretary who was the highest rank in the colony. So, you see that we
don’t have incentive to use costly way…” (Fung H.-l. , 2013).

This is in great contrast to the Citizens’ Radio Incident. In the Citizens’ Radio
Incident, the initiators thought that the institution was not open and that they had to
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employ other, non-institutional means. In the YMT case, the potential initiators had
not felt the same feeling about the institution they were dealing with. The openness
of the system and the gestures of the government were important to their
consideration.
This can be understood in the light of resource mobilization theory, which the
cost and benefit of collective movement is being weighed. The openness of the
system would provide alternative with less cost to the dissenters. The initiators,
under this circumstance, would not choose the costly way to attain their aim. This
can be noted as absence of the favorable condition for launching civil disobedience
(if favorable condition is the institutional deficit).
It would constitute an absence of the favorable condition for the emergence of
civil disobedience to happen. Fung Ho-lup agrees that:
“Not between use or not to use the means (Civil Disobedience), but the government, through
the change of the law, implemented it softly and not to oppress all the time…” (Fung H.-l. ,
2013).

The above “openness” of the government seems to be the dominant image of
the government in the 1980s in the eyes of the dissenters. This openness was not only
confined within ad-hoc negotiations with higher officials, but also being
institutionalized with the opening of elections.
And more or less at the same time, the power decentralization initiatives of the
colonial government had been launched. Whatever the intention of the move towards
power decentralization was, the opening of the closed system was started - and this
opening had drawn significant attention from the dissenters.
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Both Fung Ho-lup and Chan Shun-hing had mentioned that they had thought
about and even been invited to run for the District Board Elections (Fung H.-l. , 2013)
(Chan S.-h. , 2013). Readers may think that their experiences might not shed much
insight on the people in Hong Kong as a whole, but it is true to say that their
experiences more or less revealed the attitude of progressive social workers.
Nonetheless, both of them mentioned the change of attitude to a less skeptical one in
the social workers realm. And even if not all social workers agreed about getting into
the establishment, their focus had been shifted:
“For those who had not run for the elections, they stayed outside and at the same time, formed
a lot of monitoring groups for monitoring the work of the representatives…” (Fung H.-l. ,
2013).

Less costly way to air dissent was provided to these previous social activists. A
new type of “election-based mobilization”94 replaced the previously autonomous
organizing means that had developed from the 1970s (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 156).
The interest groups that had emerged in the 1970s were also beginning to form
united fronts backing up the struggle at the new arena. A process of transition is
shown according to Fung Ho-lup, by the cooperation among the interest and pressure
groups that emerged from time to time:
“The Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (HKPTU), SOCO and the related pressure
groups had had a close relationship. We organized several movements together, for instance,
against the rising price of the public sector services and also the opposition against the building
of the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant. These movements were just among our group of people, like
Lau Chin-shek and Seto Wah. We have not used the term (civil society), but this type of

94

Author’s own translation from the Chinese source (參政主導的民眾動員).
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cooperation among the pressure groups had been challenging the colonial government…”
(Fung H.-l. , 2013).

The united-front formed by the 1970s interest groups had become the support
for the new momentum. In the past, social movements were the sole means in which
activists could fight for interests. However, after the mid-1980s, the opening of the
political system through elections had opened new gateway for members of civil
society. This means the previously sole means were not their only option, they could
mobilize social movements to support their struggle within institutional arena - like
the cases in the above quotation. However, conflict was bound to grow as time went
by due to the different natures of the two arena. Institutional arena functions by
compromise. Social movements, however, don’t need much compromise in short
term. The “doctrine” gradually generated from getting into the establishment had
hindered the emergence of civil disobedience (this will be discussed later at 5.3.1). In
the author’s view, this kind of cooperation among organizations had expanded the
meaning of civil rights (e.g. rights to participate in politics) and strengthened civil
society. Like in the case of the YMT incident, this expanded sense of civil rights
included the right to live in a suitable shelter and reflected property rights. Freedom
of speech and assembly had been included somehow, but there was not really a
massive movement challenging the prevailing norms of freedom of assembly as set
out in the POO. However, the rights on free assembly had not been further expanded.
The political rights jumped in, to be the focus. The absence of further movements
struggling for further freedom of assembly can be attributed to the result of mixed
factors, like the special experience of the Sino-British negotiations, which drew the
focus of the people to specific topics, and the relatively tolerant attitude of the
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colonial government in the transition period which gave an absence of delegitimizing
effect.
4.2.2 Issue of the Handover
The special experience brought by the Sino-British negotiation had drawn the
focus on the issue of handover. Rather than the specific law targeted, the issue of
handover and further institutional change had been a better option to put their effort
in. As Fung Ho-lup comments:
“The Handover issue of Hong Kong had pushed all the other issues aside” (Fung H.-l. , 2013)

With the less costly means to air their demand, the favorable condition is
missed (institutional deficit). It would less likely for activists to choose a rather
costly means, civil disobedience. With the more attractive option which will bring
larger benefit than a specific law change, the activists would incline to spend their
effort on it rather than advocating change of the POO.
4.2.3 Absence of sufficient condition
Also, the government had seldom used the POO to arrest dissenters. It would
not be imperative enough for initiators to claim “it is the right time to break the
unjust law in order to attain change of it”. It was all less likely to put the dissenters
on the same front and the groups affected would have found it harder to gain support
from other, non-affected sympathizers (or civil society, if one likes to call them that).
As a special means of protest, civil disobedience relies more on the participation of
sympathizers, gained through “moral education”. So, in the absence of oppression,
the issue would have been harder to be put on agenda or draw the focus of the
majority (or to put it, without the sufficient condition).
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4.2.4 Summary
To sum up, the opening of the political system also drove political discontent
into institutional channels (less costly means are provided). And the Sino-British
negotiations drew the attention of the society, further disfavoring the launch of civil
disobedience (larger benefit issue has drawn the focus). The favorable condition is
absent.
The absence of the arrest of dissenters with the POO can be understood as an
absence of a delegitimizing event. It was the most direct effect contributing to
emergence/absence of civil disobedience movements in most of the time in 1980s.
As the government had not used the POO to arrest the dissenters, the people against
the law did not have evidence to show the government oppressing the protestors with
an unjust law. This greatly harmed the justifiability of further civil disobedience even
if civil disobedience movement has been launched. So, the absence of sufficient
condition contributed to the non-existence of civil disobedience movements in early/mid- 1980s and the absence of favorable condition would contribute to the
insignificance of it even the movement is launched.
However, the story seems to have been changed by the incident of 1989.

85

4.3 Post-1989 protests against PRC’s crackdown on democratic
movement
The effect of 1989 on Hong Kong was massive and drastic - the long lasting
sit-in of the students in Tiananmen Square had unquestionably taught a lesson to the
people of Hong Kong (Fung H.-l. , 2013) (To, 2014). The action of the students at
Tiananmen Square posed a question to the people of Hong Kong and challenged the
status quo of the time. It not only inspired people in Hong Kong on the means of
protest, but also changed the sociopolitical condition in which civil disobedience
were encouraged to be employed.
4.3.1 A lesson from Mainland China
To Kwan Hang experienced a drastic change in his thoughts after the June 4th
incident. As the Secretary General of the Hong Kong Federation of Students in April
immediately before the June 4th incident, I sought his views for this paper and he
explained his experiences:
“I had never heard of ‘civil disobedience’ before the democratic movement in Beijing. The
students there had violated the laws and regulations through their actions and later on, someone
conceptualized these acts and from there, I learnt…” (To, 2014).

The scene was set:
“After 1989 and before 1991, that was the time HKFS discussed civil disobedience most often,
and the mostly cited example would be Wu’erkaixi (吾爾開希)95 leading the students of
Beijing Normal University (北京師範大學) confronting with police for the protest on 70th
anniversary of May Fourth Movement. Some students cited this and asked ‘would you think
that’s right?’” (To, 2014)

See Photo 1: Wu’erkaixi is the one holding a flag. Photo from:
http://staff.yck2.edu.hk/departments/social/web%20use/investigation/inv64.htm
95
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Photo 1: Wu’erkaixi leading students confronting with police

This shocked To Kwan-hang at the time and, from this, he questioned the
status quo:
“That means I started to question the doctrine, so-called ‘lawful struggle’ (合法鬥爭). I
remember that this was invented by Szeto Wah who said for the sake of movement, one has to
attract as much crowd as possible. If you say to the people that the movement is illegal, who
would then come? ... However, if we are not only thinking of the number of people, but the
self-consciousness of the struggle (抗爭意識) ... Then, this is different story…” (To, 2014).

To Kwan-hang went further to explain that:
“It is because if ‘lawful struggle’ is the only doctrine we have to follow, the authority would set
more and more rules and regulations to confine you. Is it needed to follow? If so, one day you
may not need to go out for demonstrations. And what’s more important is, if there was no
unlawful struggle before, would you have a lawful struggle today?” (To, 2014)

To Kwan-hang makes one very important point here. From To Kwan-hang’s
experience, we know that the later participants (or even leaders) of the civil
disobedience were not implanting this way of protest from the Western World or
India, but were drawing inspiration from the democratic movement in Beijing.96

96

There is also a discontinuity to the social movements of the 1970s.
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That’s crucial to the development of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong.
However, as one may know, the civil disobedience movements launched by To
Kwan-hang and his companions did not come immediately after the June 4th Incident,
but sometime later. Why was that?
4.3.2 Government suddenly reemployed the law
“Interviewer: You declared not to apply the license on 24th December 1989, and then really did
civil disobedience on 4th June 1992. Is that right?
To Kwan-hang: Yes, in fact, from 1989 Dec to 1992 June, we had done nothing on challenging
the law”97 (To, 2014).

From the point of being inspired, through to the declarations that taking action
was necessary,98 and then to the point when action actually took place99 was a period
of about one and a half years. Why would that be?
On the reason why the first maximalist civil disobedience100 after the 1989
Tiananmen Incident was in 1992, To Kwan-hang explained:
“The law would become a question only when you had been troubled by that. In the past, even
though I had not applied the license, the authority would give you the license or just let you
went on without it. No one would felt that there was any importance on the law because it just
ceased to be working when no one had enforced it” (To, 2014).

So, when had the government troubled the protestors with the law?

From author’s research, HKFS had done something, which has been summarized in Table 2. For To
Kwan Hang, 1992.06.04 would be his first day to practice civil disobedience (To, 2010, p. 138)
98
From being warned as holding an unauthorized assembly on 24th Dec 1989, To Kwan-hang had
declared not to apply license from the Police afterwards (Apple Daily, 2012).
99
The first civil disobedience after 1989, according to To Kwan-hang, was the one on 4th June 1992
(To, 2014).
100
This is the first civil disobedience that fulfilled both the minimalist and high-end definition,
according to this author’s research. The critical distinction is the leader’s consciousness - whether
he/she would employ this means consciously as a process of “moral education”. In To’s quotation on
“self-consciousness of the struggle (抗爭意識)”, a clear aim is to educate the participants on what
should be done.
97
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According to To Kwan-hang, the attitude towards protestors had changed from
tolerant to intolerant from 1990 (To, 2014). His observations on the mechanisms
behind this change are interesting:
“My thought is the colonial government had been suffering a great pressure from the China
side. After 1989, should Xujiatun (許家屯) be a watershed? We haven’t known yet. But after
the ‘929 Event’,101 there was an interlude. As reported by the South China Morning Post, a
letter written by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the PRC mentioned that the British was not planning to turn Hong Kong into a basis
to overthrow the regime in China. The letter even cited the example of ‘929 Event’ in which
some members of the April Fifth Action were arrested” (To, 2014)

101

929 Event here means: To Kwan Hang, as invited, planned to show a slogan abruptly in the
cocktail party held by Xinhua News Agency, but failed. At the same time, the members of the April
Fifth Action had a serious conflict with a policeman in Causeway Bay.
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Date/Event

Government’s Action

1989.12.24 Few hundred students

-

started procession from the Hong
Kong Polytechnic (see Figure 4)

-

HKFS Response

Asked for a license (the students had notified the

-

Declared that they will no longer apply a

police, but not applied for a license)

license for protest from police (Hong Kong

Ask the students to go in rows not more than 20

Federation of Students, 1994, p. 13)

persons
-

Registered the information of the leaders (See
Figure 4)

-

Sent a warning letter (Hong Kong Federation of
Students, 1994, p. 13)

1990.06.03 Few dozens of students

-

Police refused the demand of the students on

-

About 50 students trespassed the frontier

protest before the Xinhua News

protesting at the front door of the building

“nonviolently” (Hong Kong Federation of

Agency Buildings

(Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994, p.

Students, 1994, p. 13)

13)
1991.02.01 Protest before the Xinhua

-

Well prepared with fences (Hong Kong

90

-

Trespass the frontier (Hong Kong

News Agency Buildings 102
1991.06.02 A hundred of students

Federation of Students, 1994, p. 13)
-

Deploy policemen before the front door to

protest before the Xinhua News

defend the building (Hong Kong Federation of

Agency Buildings

Students, 1994, p. 50)

1992.06.05 Few hundred of students

-

Interrupt the processions in the meantime

protest before the Xinhua News

-

Deploy many polices around the building and

Agency buildings

put fences outside few dozen meters of the
building
-

--

-

Reject the suggestion (Binding Over) of
the prosecuting side

-

Hope to change the law via the judicial
branch with the newly passed HKBORO

Prosecuted the three leaders of HKFS (Tsoi Yiu
Cheong, Wong Ching Man and To Kwan Hang)

Table 2 Summary on civil disobedience movements done by HKFS from 1989 to 1992
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Federation of Students, 1994, p. 13)

Unknown number of students

91

Figure 4 Sing Tao Daily-1989-12-25

From the above table (Table 2) and Figure 4, we can see that, from 1989.12.24
onwards, HKFS members had already carried out actions fulfilling the definition of
civil disobedience (it is discussed later on whether they were only minimalist or both
minimalist and maximalist). The number of participants ranged from few dozen to a
few hundred.
So, in fact, from 1990.06.03 on, there had been HKFS students carrying out
actions fulfilling the minimalist requirement of civil disobedience. On the question of
whether their acts fulfilled the maximalist definition, the author can seek to confirm
it with the participants themselves and try to understand whether they were
consciously doing that.
According to the author’s research, we can only confirm that, when To Kwan
Hang did his civil disobedience on 1992.06.04, he had did indeed have that
consciousness in mind (To, 2014). So, whether it was Tsoi Yiu Cheong or To Kwan
92

Hang starting first, the maximalist civil disobedience movement in Hong Kong was a
product of inspiration and stimulated by the police’s interruption. However, why did
the police suddenly employ the law?
Describing the behavior of the colonial government of the time, To Kwan-hang
has used the term ‘beneficent autocrat’. This beneficent autocrat had her own
political calculation to make: a balance of political interest and acting accordingly
(To, 2014). That sheds some light on the following facts.
From 1990 on, the old ways of tolerating protestors (like giving licenses to
them proactively, or escorting protestors without arresting or seeking conflict with
them) had gone. This new attitude lasted until the Patten era (To, 2014) (the reason
behind this atmosphere in Patten’s era will be discussed in the last chapter).
To show more clearly how the attitude changed in the era, some discussion of
relevant facts needs to take place:
“Using our example,103 before Xuijiatun left, the policemen didn’t really care what you had
done before the Xinhua News Agency Building. But right after that, Zhou Nan came, you
could not do the same thing. However, later when Chris Patten came, you could do that again
because Chris Patten was simply confronting with the China side…” (To, 2014).

To Kwan-hang went on to raise more concrete examples to show that the
arrests and charges brought on them were a result of political considerations:
“We had a lot of experience. We had many protest or demonstrations where radical acts were
within, the authority had not charged us. Although quite disordered scene was caused by
burning tires or conflicting with the police, they had not even arrested you to the police station.
Even though for that time I had trespassed into the venue of the Provisional Legislative
103

Here he means the charges and prosecution of unauthorized assembly on To Kwan Hang, Richard
Tsoi Yiu Cheong and Wong Ching Man. Their prosecution was on their illegal protest on June 4 th
1992, before the Xinhua News Agency Building (To, 2010).
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Council when I was going against it, I was not prosecuted with unauthorized assembly. They
just told me that they might charge me with misconduct or assaulting a police, but
consequently, they had proposed a ‘binding over’ (撤銷起訴) to me. This was not the only
instance, but also the one trespassing to Lok Ma Chau…” (To, 2014).

4.3.3. Factors affecting significance
Although being oppressed with an “unjust law”, and the protestors having
consciously embedded ‘civil disobedience’ in their heads, the civil disobedience did
not successfully transform into a larger movement that was comparable to the one in
2000. To Kwan-hang elucidated:
“As I have experienced some colonial era, I have an impression that the colonial government
was relatively responsive, remember that it is just relatively, and also relatively smart. She
knew how to flexibly use politics to solve the political problem, not always oppressing. … This
makes the civil disobedience became less convincing especially when people can feel the
freedom. For sure, people’s consciousness (on political rights) are really important, because
doing a civil disobedience has a lot of challenges to the people themselves. Why must it illegal?
Why not a legal protest opposing the law?” (To, 2014)

Another explanation was on the political culture:
“Interviewer: To ask people confront illegally, would not be the majority at the time, right?
To Kwan-hang: Yes, because Hong Kong people had not yet got used to that.” (To, 2014)

So, in the case of To Kwan-hang, as one of the pioneers in the history of civil
disobedience in Hong Kong, the emergence of civil disobedience was not really a
matter of participants and leaders, but of the right time to carry it out. Being inspired
by the June 4th Incident in Beijing, the legitimacy of the doctrine developed from the
1970s, the so-called “lawful struggle”, was challenged by some groups. Although
they constituted only a minority, we can also see that they had a new consciousness
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regarding struggle. Forgetting the number of participants, they seemed more inclined
to focus on the empowerment of the individuals participating.
The insignificance can be explained not only by the lagging political culture104,
but also the absence of favorable condition affecting the significance of civil
disobedience movements. For instance, the political system, from 1989 to 1991,
would be undergoing a further opening and reform. The Legislative Council was at
its first time to have seats being elected geographically. It is hard to convince the
majority why institutional deficit exists. So, in the absence of favorable condition,
the civil disobedience movements launched would not have a large participation rate.
Although that may not be significant in some eyes, the post-1989 civil
disobedience movement is a significant insight on the development of civil
disobedience movements in Hong Kong. It was the first time this means was
employed consciously. However, this means was learnt from the experience of the
student movement in Beijing. Responding to the stimulus (the police’s “oppression”),
civil disobedience movement emerged again.
To sum up, the post-1989 civil disobedience movement was the product of
stimulus of sudden re-employment of the POO (which might be the product of the
democratic movement in 1989 itself). With the sufficient condition, the civil
disobedience movements emerged. However, without the favorable condition, the
movement was not wide-spread and significant.

104

Political culture may be the answer, however, it cannot be measured now. So, the author would
attribute to other possibilities.

95

4.4 Revitalizing Civil Disobedience: 2000 Anti-Public Order Ordinance
Demonstrations
If the civil disobedience movement of 1992 was not significant enough in
some eyes, the wave of the Anti-Public Order Ordinance Demonstrations in 2000 can
certainly be counted as the first significant civil disobedience movement in Hong
Kong history because it was the first time the “moderate democrats”105 joined. In the
series of demonstrations held after the delayed arrest of the university students,
legislative councilors - even the founder of the previously mentioned doctrine of
demonstrations (the “lawful struggle”), Szeto Wah and Martin Lee - participated in
illegal demonstrations (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2000b). That’s significant in
the history of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong for two reasons. Firstly,
the size of participation was huge compared with the previous civil disobedience
movements in Hong Kong.106 Even though there were just about 1,200 people at the
peak on 8th October 2000, the number is still large in the sense that it was an illegal
demonstration. Secondly, that was one of the few, if not the only, illegal
demonstration participated in by the moderate democrats, who were the advocates or
even founders of the doctrine, “lawful protest” that developed from the 1970s and
1980s. So, this paper will now explore why this series of illegal demonstrations burst
out. The sequence of the movements is summarized as follows.

What should be noted is the previous advocates on “lawful struggle” like Szeto Wah and Martin
Lee, were there to join the “unlawful protest” (Apple Daily, 2000b). This should weigh more towards
the significance - especially in the Hong Kong context.
106
This thesis would count the YMT Incident as civil disobedience (even if it just fulfilled the
minimalist definition, but not the high-end one). The movements of HKFS, carried out from 1989 to
1992, also fulfilled the minimalist definition but only questionably the high-end definition. To Kwan
Hang’s civil disobedience in 1992 should be seen as the one fulfilling both the minimalist and highend definition. It should be counted as the first civil disobedience in Hong Kong fulfilling both the
definitions, according to author’s research. However, the number of the participants was still small. It
was about a few hundred and confined mainly to students (To, 2014, p. 138).
105
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Event

No. of part.

Participating Organization /

Police Arrest?

Prosecution?

No

N/A

Yes, with POO (unlawful

No, on 2000.

assembly), on 2000. 09. 29a

10. 05109

Parties
1999. 06. 22 Anti-

Few hundred to A

-

HKFS

Reinterpretation of Basic

thousand107

-

Citizens Party

-

Rights of Abode Advocates

-

HKFS

Law
2000. 04. 20

Below hundred108

Demonstration related to
University Tuition Fee
2000. 06. 26 Anti-

Few hundred

Reinterpretation of Basic

-

HKFS

Yes, with POO (unlawful

No, on 2000.

-

Rights of Abode Advocates

assembly), on 2000. 08.

10. 25111

Law (1st Anniversary) /

17110b

107

(Apple Daily, 1999, p. A16)
(The Sun, 2000, p. SUN Current News)
109
(Ming Pao, 2000a, p. A02)
110
(Apple Daily, 2000, p. A09)
108
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“626 Event”
2000. 08. 19 Assembly in

Ten CU and HKU

-

HKFS

-

-

front of Police HQ

rep.112

2000. 08. 20

~150

-

HKCTU

No

N/A

Demonstration against

-

HKFS

POO

-

The Frontier

-

April Fifth Action113

-

HKFS

N/A

N/A

2000. 08. 27

Less than 30114

Demonstration against
POO

111

(Wéi, 2000, p. b02)
(Apple Daily, 2000a, p. A06)
113
(Sing Tao Daily, 2000a, p. A04) (Hong Kong Daily News, 2000a, p. A06)
114
(Hong Kong Economic Times, 2000a, p. A27)
112
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2000. 10. 02

~300

-

No

N/A

No

N/A

(including DP, HKPTU)115

Assembly against POO

2000. 10. 08

9 LegCo Candidates

~1200116

Demonstration against

-

10 District Council mem.

-

HKFS

-

“Old” Social Activists117

-

Legislators: Szeto Wah,118
Cheung Man-

POO

kwong
Albert Ho
-

HKCTU119

-

April Fifth Action120

115

(Apple Daily, 2000b, p. A01)
(Hong Kong Daily News, 2000b, p. A01)
117
(Hong Kong Economic Times, 2000b, p. A27)
118
Ibid.
119
(Sing Tao Daily, 2000b, p. A01)
120
Ibid.
116
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-

Mass Media rep.: Raymond
Wong121,
Stephen
Shiu

2000. 10. 15

~300122

Demonstration against
POO

-

HKCTU123

-

HKFS124

-

April Fifth Action125

-

NWSC126

-

Legislators127: Lee Cheuk-yan

No

Emily Lau

121

Ibid.
(Hong Kong Daily News, 2000c, p. A02)
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
122
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N/A

Lau Chin-shek
2000. 11. 05

~20 - 40128129

Assembly against POO

-

HKFS130

-

April Fifth Action131

-

Scholars132

-

Legislator133: James To Kun-

N/A

N/A

sun
Table 3 The First Wave of Anti-POO Demonstrations
a. 5 HKFS members were charged.134 They are: Yuen Hoi-yan 袁凱欣, Fung Ka-keung 馮家強, Chan King-chi 陳敬慈, Fung Kai-yuen 馮繼遠 and Cheung Wen-kay 張韻琪

-

b. 7 HKFS members were charged.135 They are: Yuen Hoi-yan 袁凱欣, Fung Ka-keung 馮家強, Chan King-chi 陳敬慈, Fung Kai-yuen 馮繼遠, Cheung Wen-kay 張韻
琪, Chu Kong-wai 朱江瑋 and Siu Yu-kwan 蕭裕均.HKFS: Hong Kong Federation of Students 香港專上學生聯會

128

(Ming Pao, 2000b, p. A05)
(Sing Tao Daily, 2000c, p. A05)
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid.
134
(The Sun, 2000, p. SUN Current News)
135
(Sing Pao Daily News, 2000, p. A01)
129
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-

Citizens Party 民權黨

-

POR: Public Order Ordinance 公安條例

-

HKCTU: Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions 香港職工會聯盟

-

The Frontier 前線

-

April Fifth Action 四五行動

-

DP: Democratic Party 民主黨

-

HKPTU: Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union 香港教育專業人員協會

-

“Old” Social Activists: Richard Tsoi 蔡耀昌, Lui Tai-lok 呂大樂, Cheung Bing-leung 張炳良, Fung Ho-Mak Hoi-Wah 麥海華, Yip Kin-yuen 葉建源

-

NWSC: Neighborhood and Workers Services Centre 街坊工友服務處
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4.4.1 A Calculated Response: “we have never planned to do so”
As one can see from the above table, the series of demonstrations aiming at
the POO was agitated by the arrest of the HKFS members on 26th June 2000 and 29th
September 2000 respectively. The related demonstrations they participated in were
not aimed at the POO, but university tuition fees and the 1st anniversary of the
reinterpretation of the Basic Law.
By interviewing two of the seven university students arrested and charged, the
emergence of the series of civil disobedience movement has been elucidated. That’s
coherent with the previous discussion in this chapter, where the emergence of civil
disobedience movement is still seen as a calculated response (facing the sudden
change of sociopolitical environment, acts after weighing the cost/benefit). It was not
a process from thought to action. One may know, after 1989 when To Kwan Hang
announced that participants would not apply for permissions, that similar decisions
had become a tradition of the HKFS. However, this would be reviewed annually and
the committee would be left to decide for themselves whether they would follow the
tradition. As Fung Ka Keung and Chu Kong Wai136 both mentioned:
“Basically, we would discuss the annual plan when we have the first meeting of the Standing
Committee. That would for sure include whether apply the permit or not, and basically we
won’t apply…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013).
“We would discuss this issue every year. It is a must. We cannot do it just because the previous
committee did it. It is the core reason of student’s participation in movements. In certain sense,
this reflected the values behind, which are the independent thinking and the democratic belief”
(Chu, 2014).

136

Both Fung Ka Keung and Chu Kong Wai were one of the seven members of HKFS arrested on 26 th
June 2000 (the 626 Event). Fung Ka Keung later mentioned that he was also involved in the case of
the university tuition fees protests that happened on 20th April 2000 (the 420 Event).
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Although they both agreed that the Public Order Ordinance was on their
agenda, does it mean the emergence of civil disobedience movement at the year was
the result of their planning? The answer is negative. According to Fung Ka Keung:
“At 2000, we did not have an agenda to challenge the Public Order Ordinance. We were just
routinely not applying from the Police, but we did not plan to put the POO into first priority.
We were focusing on the commercialization of education…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013).

It means that it was not an active plan for the HKFS to carry out civil
disobedience movement on a specific day, but a calculated response. This interesting
point needs more discussion. How did the relatively large scale civil disobedience
movement (or the author calls it significant) emerge?
It happened after the delayed charges were brought against the university
students that had participated in two demonstrations, which were not aimed at the
POO (The Sun, 2000). Asking the two participants about their psychological
preparation at the time, we get a more convincing answer that supports the idea that
they had not expected to be charged, never mind planned to challenge the POO.
“We have not expected being charged. It should be said in this way. We knew that it was
possible, but not prepared that would happen on us…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013).
“We have not expected being charged. The environment at the time was not that tense, not
much charge would be put on activists…” (Chu, 2014).

As to the means of protest, there was a difference:
“As a citizen, our demand is simple. We just want to let our voice heard. … At the time, the
normal way of protest was just to let the letter received by some officials at the entrance, and
that’s done. We were not going to disobey anyone or any law…” (Chu, 2014).
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It was after the sudden arrest of the students that the focus and the means of
protest of society and the HKFS itself were swiftly shifted:
“After being charged, we deliberately challenge it by not applying it…” (Chu, 2014).

This is a very crucial point. The later series of civil disobedience movements
directly challenging the Public Order Ordinance was purely a result of the sudden
arrest of the students. This act of the police had aroused the attention of the public to
the law. According to Chu, this act had stimulated a nerve of the “backbone”137 of
Hong Kong society - arousing their memory of the students’ movements in the 1960s
and 1970s and also the nightmare of 1989. The university students of 2000 were the
bottom line of their comfort zone. Once the university students were being touched,
they could feel the danger (Chu, 2014).
On the emergence of a relatively large scale civil disobedience, Chu has his
own explanation:
“(Firstly,) the society had experienced a political awakening since 1980s. For how much, that
is hard to weight. But at least, since 1989, people in Hong Kong had put more focus on
whether they would been silenced and whether blood had been been shed for the expression of
different opinions. … This worry had been intensified since 1997…” (Chu, 2014).

The worry had originated from the nightmare experience of 1989. A change of
political culture (the detailed discussion of the change in political culture will be left
to the last chapter). This worry had been exacerbated by these first arrests since
handover of university students. Chu has a special explanation for the people’s
sensitive response:

He uses this word to describe those elites at the time that had experienced the students’ movement
in the 1960s and 1970s, and the massacre of 1989 (Chu, 2014).
137
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“At the time, there was a saying, ‘Wow, they would even arrest the students?’ This was the
implanted ideology originated from the 1970s social movements. From Diao Yu Island, to anticorruption movement and to later pressure groups movements, university students had their
footprints. The participants or observers has now been the backbone of the media sector,
cultural sector, educational and professional sectors. They would think ‘university students’ as
their bottom line” (Chu, 2014).

The explanation given here by Chu is not really a scientific investigation, but a
speculation of a participant. It might not be refutable, but it still acts as a possible
explanation for the change of political culture after 1989.
Maybe the political culture had really changed in the above way. But still, we
can understand the arrest on students in the perspective of cost/benefit analysis. The
arrest on students was very costly in the eyes of the sympathizers. It represented a
new way of governance linking to the event in 1989. This is a cost they don’t want to
bear, a cost even larger than the cost brought by participating in civil disobedience
movements. Also, through ways other than civil disobedience movements, the aim,
changing the law, would be impossible. So, they participated in the movements.
The civil disobedience movements in 2000 was again a result of the sufficient
condition. Its significance can be understood in changing political culture or
existence of favorable condition (institutional deficit). Institutional deficit is quite
convincing especially when quite a lot of legislators had participated in the
movement.
On the other side, the reasons behind the action taken by the government are
worth discussing in this chapter. To Kwan Hang explained the different attitude
taken by the government was the result of pressure from China, exemplified by the
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change of the director of Xinhua News Agency. This time, why had the government
acted so vigorously with the university students?
Fung Ka Keung has his own explanation:
“They charged us not because of the participation in the 626 event,138 but because of the arson
at the Immigration Department.139 The charge was the opportunistic oppression after the arson
by the new immigrant…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013).

As we can see from the Table 3, the date the HKFS members were arrested was
17th August 2000 (Apple Daily, 2000, p. A09). That’s after the arson happened on 2nd
August 2000. So, Fung’s idea is that, after the arson, Hong Kong people had a bad
impression of the new immigrants. The government officials of the time, especially
Ip Lau Suk Yi, did not want these people staying in Hong Kong. So, they took the
chance to oppress the new immigrants and the related supporters together (Fung K.k. , 2013).140 As one may know, the HKFS had participated enthusiastically in the
fight for the rights of abode of those new immigrants.141
Another explanation is that the arrest was coincidently only a few days before
National Day, and was designed to act as a deterrent to the activists who might think
about protesting on National Day (The Sun, 2000).

138

Here he means the protest against the 1st anniversary of Anti-Reinterpretation of Basic Law on 26th
June 2000.
139
The arson was conducted on 2nd August 2000, in the building of the Immigration Department. In
the accident, one officer of the Immigration Department, Leung Kam-kong, was killed (Hong Kong
Daily News, 2000, p. A06). After that, the violent acts had been denounced seriously (Wen Wei Po,
2000, p. A03).
140
And from some radical pro-Beijing newspapers, we can see where the arrow aimed at. For instance,
some political parties and the people “seducing” the devastating struggle should be responsible (Wen
Wei Po, 2000, p. A03). Also, the arson was claimed not as a coincidence, but a “necessary result” of
the “cooperation between the ‘Anti-Tung Chin-wah’ power and the smugglers” (Wen Wei Po, 2000, p.
A04)
141
Some scholars have even speculated that the arrest was revenge on the students after the arson in
their joint signatures (Apple Daily, 2000c, p. A08).
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Whatever the reason behind the sudden arrests (in both To’s case and this case),
the government’s sudden employment of the law seemed to reveal the illegitimacy of
the law itself, which in turn provided an opportunity for the activists to challenge the
law by directly violating it. The reason behind the government’s reemployment of
the law is unknown and needs further investigation. However, the emergence of civil
disobedience movements (in To’s case and this case also) was the direct result of the
reemployment. The reemployment drew the attention of the public to the
arbitrariness of the law, and in turn contributed to participation in civil disobedience.
In other words, the reemployment echoes the “delegitimizing effect” mentioned in
the case of India, which gave the opposition a higher moral ground. Although the
government was not massacring anyone, the sudden arrests at a sensitive moment
drew more accusations142 by the media and aroused skepticism in the public.

142

For instance, (Apple Daily, 2000c, p. A08) regarded the sudden arrest of the students after the
arson in early August as being an oppression of the students’ movement - using the public disgrace of
the new immigrants. Another newspaper (The Sun, 2000) maintained that another arrest of students on
29th September 2000 resembled the practices of the Mainland.

108

4.5 Chapter Summary
Interviewee/ Incident
Chan Shuk Hing/ Yau Ma

Is/ isn’t civil disobedience
Minimalist

Reasons on emergence or non-emergence provided by interviewees


Tei Boat People Incident
Fung Ho Lup

To Kwan Hang/ 1992. 06.

they don’t have the idea (civil disobedience) in mind.
Not employed related



Political system was comparatively open.

means, but via the



Different focuses rather than the law

international pressure143



Government had seldom used the law.

Maximalist



Awakened by the June 4th Incident, on the possibility of “unlawful struggle”.



Government suddenly reemployed the POO to arrest the activists. To Kwan-

04 Protest at Xin Hua
News Agency Building
Fung Ka Keung/ 2000
Anti-POO

The law was too arbitrary and irrational. So, that’s too easy to violate, even

hang speculated that was the result of the pressure from China.
Maximalist



A calculated response to the government’s sudden reemployment of POO.



The reason why government reemployed the law was the aim to oppress the
movement after the arson happened in the Immigration Department.

143

That means the 39 international NGOs sent their enquiries to the Hong Kong Government about their concern regarding the YMT Incident. That was after SOCO exposed
the situation of Hong Kong to them (Fung H.-l. , 2013).
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Chu Kong Wai/ 2000 AntiPOO

Maximalist



People had more concern or protection on the universities students at the time.



A calculated response to the government’s sudden reemployment of POO



The reason people had more protection on universities students was the
backbone of society had experienced the social movements led by students.
They knew the importance of that.

Table 4 Chapter Summary
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From the above table that summarizes the core content of this chapter, we can
see that the emergence of civil disobedience movements challenging the POO was, in
fact, a calculated response. Firstly, the minimalist civil disobedience movement was
the response to the government’s sudden employment of the law to deter the acts of
the activists. As they had not applied for permission for years, they considered it
irrational to do so. They naturally disobeyed the commands of the police. Although
the interviewees recognized that they were not carrying out a civil disobedience
movement consciously, they had disobeyed the law nonviolently and publicly. So,
that fulfilled a part of the comprehensive definition of civil disobedience and the
author called it minimalist civil disobedience movement.
In the 1980s, until 1989 (conservatively speaking it could be until 1992),144 the
POO had not been challenged by civil disobedience movements. Even the ‘victim’ of
the Yau Ma Tei Incident, Fung Ho Lup had not employed this means of challenging
the law. Except for challenging the law in the courts, what had been used was the
international pressure on the government from different international NGOs. Fung
explained that the means was not appropriate. The opening of the political system
had provided other possible ways (in other words, absence of favorable condition).
Inherited from the 1970s, their main focus was on different policy aspects and
handover and, more importantly, they had not been arrested with the law again. .
The employment of civil disobedience movement by To Kwan Hang illustrated
very well the nature of this means. Deviating from the doctrine, ‘lawful struggle’, To
had been inspired by the scene of the June 4th incident. Although being inspired by it,
144

It is because the author of this thesis can only conduct with To Kwan Hang in that series of civil
disobedience from 1989 to 1992. To Kwan-hang participated in civil disobedience consciously in
1992. He described the period from 1989 to 1992 as a period of discussion (To, 2014). However,
according to the author’s research (see Table 2), there were some movements conducted before the
Xinhua News Agency Buildings at the time which were similar to the requirements of the minimalist
definition.
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the means was not employed as the direct result of the thought. The employment was
the direct result and a calculated response to the oppression of government, which
provided a chance for the activists to reveal the illegitimacy of the law to the public.
The government oppression, in To’s eyes, was an opportunistic calculation which
avoided embarrassing the British Government. However, the challenge had not
successfully aroused the conscientiousness of the majority to join their disobedience.
To Kwan-hang explains that with the lagging political culture, the author of this
thesis incline to believe in the absence of favorable condition (political system was
undergoing reform). Later on, the law had been amended by Chris Patten and the
attitude of severe oppression had been directed towards the activists.
The reemployment of the POO did not take place until a few years after
handover. As admitted by the two interviewees participating in the significant civil
disobedience movements in 2000, the emergence was also a calculated response. The
relatively large scale participation was the result of the “delegitimizing effect” of the
arrest of the university students. Both of the interviewees involved in this incident
admitted that the university students had still enjoyed the “protection”145 that is no
longer enjoyed by students. The arrest of the university students had triggered the
political sensitivity of the backbone of the society, who had experienced the 1970s
student movements, pressure groups politics, the Sino-British negotiations and the
June 4th incident (in their eyes, it would be the very cost they cannot bear). Also, the
absence of favorable condition contributed to the significance as the pace of political
reform after Handover was obviously slowed down comparing with the last few
years of British rule.
That’s a word used by my interviewee, Chu Kong Wai, on his description of the severe response of
the public when they knew that university students were arrested due to the peaceful assembly. He
thinks that there was a “protection” of the students at the time, which is not enjoyed by students
nowadays (Chu, 2014).
145
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To sum up, the reasons for the emergence of civil disobedience movements
against the POO were multi-factored. It was a calculated response to the sufficient
condition “delegitimizing effect” - in this case the government employment of the
law in each of the cases above. Also, its significance was dependent on the existence
of favorable condition. The more favorable conditions are, the more significance of
civil disobedience movement is.
The insight brought by this chapter is that, the emergences of the civil
disobedience movements above were all due to the response to stimuli. The first
instance, the YMT Incident, a minimalist civil disobedience movement, was not
transplanted from foreign ideas. However, the emergence of maximalist civil
disobedience movement after 1989 was learnt from students’ movements in Beijing,
but still stimulated by the reemployment of the law. The significance was confined
by the lagging political culture and the absence of favorable condition.
It sheds some light on the investigation of civil disobedience, to which the
investigation of the great thinkers like Gandhi and Martin Luther King was important,
but the sociopolitical conditions leading to emergences should have a larger share of
intellectual interest.
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Chapter 5 Implication
5.1 Revision of Hypothesis
Necessary

Existence of (quasi-) civil society in which freedom of speech

Condition

is protected by law

Sufficient Condition the Delegitimizing Effect
Has the hypothesis drawn from the cases in Nazi Germany and India above
been refuted by the empirical study carried out in chapters 3 and 4? The answer is no,
but it has been refined. The emergence of civil disobedience in Hong Kong has
followed the hypothesis as assumed. Civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong
emerged with the legitimizing effect provided the existence of (quasi-) civil society.
However, to explain the emergence of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong
better, one more point has to be added to the hypothesis for a general explanation of
civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong - which will then be able to be refuted
in the future by other studies.
Collected from the interviews with the initiators of the Citizens’ Radio, there
are some factors mentioned which are neither necessary nor sufficient. They are just
favorable conditions. It is about the justifiability and the significance of the civil
disobedience movements. And these points have been raised in the debate on civil
disobedience. They can be used to explain if the civil disobedience movements
emerged wide-spread or not, but not better explain the emergence of civil
disobedience movements. Their roles can now be illustrated with the support of
empirical findings.
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Firstly, the most obvious defense made by the initiators is that there was no
other normal or legal way out.146 We can call it the “last resort argument”. This “last
resort argument” has been raised by my interviewee in the Citizens’ Radio Incident.
It was equal to the favorable condition called “institutional deficit”. In fact, that
cannot explain the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio (at least not in the sense that it
happened immediately upon the initiators feeling that there was no way out). It can,
however, better justify the launch of civil disobedience. So, we can put it under the
title of the favorable condition.
The second favorable condition found isthe stronger constitutional and legal
ground encouraged the activists to consider the launch of civil disobedience
movements (again - that the emergence was not the immediate result). The stronger
constitutional ground (e.g. supported by the HKBORO or Basic Law) encouraged to
activists to bear the risk of launching civil disobedience movements. And the risk of
imprisonment was smaller because they had a stronger argument in the courts to
avoid being jailed. It then minimizes the cost activists would bear with the launch of
civil disobedience movements. Also, the stronger constitutional ground can convince
more sympathizers to participate or to inspire them as a moral education. In the view
of benefit, the stronger constitutional ground is likely to make larger benefit.
So, the hypothesis can be summarized as follows:
Necessary

Existence of civil society in which freedom of speech is

Condition

protected by law

Favorable

Institutional deficits

We can see it from the “second condition” of John Rawls and the “closed political system” of Lui
and Chiu.
146
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Condition

Stronger constitutional ground

Sufficient Condition the Delegitimizing Effect
Inspired by the Resource Mobilization (RM) theory and the Political
Opportunity Structure theory in the study of social movement in sociology, we can
follow its perspective treating social actors as “conscious actors making rational
choices” (Diani & Della Porta, 1999, p. 9). Although the theory was not invented to
explain the emergence of civil disobedience movements, it has allowed analysts to
study the relationship between the sociopolitical condition and the “type and nature”
of resources in activists’ hands and their tactical choices (Diani & Della Porta, 1999,
p. 8).
So, in the eyes of initiators of civil disobedience movements, what resources
would be needed for a mobilization of civil disobedience movements? Among the
RM theorists, resources may be distinguished into “material resources” (work,
money, concrete benefits, services) and “non-material resources” (authority, moral
engagement, faith, friendship) (Diani & Della Porta, 1999, p. 8).
As a special way of protest, civil disobedience may require some resources
more than others. To participate in a civil disobedience movement, one has to stand
firm in one’s moral beliefs (about what’s right or wrong) and be willing to accept the
consequent punishment. The cost would be imprisonment or the possible violence
faced. The benefit would be their aim, like change of the law or policy and the moral
education of others. So, the non-material resources like moral engagement147 or
moral courage are needed, which means how firm they would stand for their moral

Moral engagement is a “…commitment to behaving morally… despite social pressures to
participate in or passively comply with policies and actions.” (Moral engagement: Introduction, 2010)
147
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belief. When more people are willing to engage with the “morality” and sacrifice,
they are more likely to participate in civil disobedience movements.
What would affect the cost and benefit of the decision to stand firm in one’s
moral stance? The answer lies in the previous chapters: the sociopolitical condition.
It is the condition that affects one’s rational calculation on whether to initiate or
participate in civil disobedience or not. This is inspired by the Political Opportunity
Structure theory putting their focus on environment affecting the rational calculation.
Types of

Cost / Benefit148

Conditions

Condition
Necessary

Existence of (quasi-) civil society in which

Condition

freedom of speech (and certain level of

-ve / +ve

freedom of association) is protected by law
Favorable

Institutional deficits

N/A / +ve

Condition

Stronger constitutional ground

Sufficient

the Delegitimizing Effect

N/A / +ve

Condition

In this last chapter, the author would like to explain how these conditions were
formed in the historical context of Hong Kong. In other words, what were the
historical forces behind the respective sociopolitical conditions contributing to the
emergence?

Let’s assume cost here includes life, property, freedom, etc. And benefit includes the change of the
unjust law, the success of moral education, etc.
148
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5.2 The existence of (quasi-) civil society in Hong Kong
As defined in section 1.2.4, the working definition of civil society can be
summarized into a few indicators: 1) autonomy from state and economy; 2) openness
(above all of the intimate sphere like family, which is closed); 3) relying on
voluntary participation; 4) freedom for citizens to communicate and associate.
From when did this kind of society exist in Hong Kong? According to the
scholars studying the development of civil society in Hong Kong, we had bottom-up
Kai Fong associations handling the issues relating to the Chinese population, which
mediated between the Chinese in Hong Kong, the colonial government and even the
Chinese government. A classic example of this kind of association, and one that
illustrates their function well, is the one at Man Mo Temple (Chan K.-m. , 2010).
However, even though there was a lot of bottom-up associations and charity
organizations in Hong Kong before the 1960s, “civil society”149 had not emerged or
was too weak in its civil-ness. In other words, there was indeed some public space
for the Chinese to organize, but this public space had not been used to fight with the
colonial government for interests or used for mobilization. This “political stability”
has been explained by different scholars from different perspectives.150 We could
even say that there were voluntary organizations existing before the 1960s, but
society (civil or “Minjian”) was heavily depoliticized. It did not fulfil the basic
function of a civil society, in which arena better public lives could be pursued. So, if

According to Chan, “Minjian shehui” (民間社會) would be more appropriate to be used for
describing the shape of Chinese society in Hong Kong before 1967, especially for its depoliticized
character (Chan K.-m. , 2010). The collective movements in the public realm were still severely
controlled by the colonial government before the 1960s. At the same time, the apathy towards public
life shared by the Chinese residents and refugees was common. This made the civil society very weak,
if it existed at all.
150
For instances see Lau’s “utilitarianistic familism”, “minimally-integrated socio-political system”
(1983), King’s “administrative absorption” (1981)and Hoadley’s “refugee mentality” (1974).
149
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we cannot refute entirely the existence of civil society in Hong Kong before the
1960s, it could only be described as a very underdeveloped one.
The watershed in its development is the 1967 Riot. Shocked by the communists,
but with social inequality well exposed, the identity of the Hong Kong people was
changed. It was characterized by the post-war baby boomers refusing the identity of
“refugee”, articulating their strong criticisms of corruption, housing problems, the
labor environment, education and public services, and demanding cultural
recognition (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 159). The student movements that emerged in the
1970s had shown civil society was in formation or being activated. It was also a
change in political culture that departed from the “utilitarianistic familism” or
“refugee mentality” and that was so well recognized before.
So, though it is hard to weigh to what extent civil society existed, the
characteristics (autonomous, open, participated voluntarily and free to communicate
and associate151) of it had been shown in the series of social movements preceding
the Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident in 1979.
The YMT Incident happened in this historical context. The participant, Chan
Shun-hing, was at the time a university student. That exactly suits the situation
mentioned above.
The first emergence of civil disobedience movement (though not maximalist
one) was a response to the sudden employment of the POO. It had its roots in the
historical context. In the 1970s, the citizenship was undergoing expansion and
expanding through different kinds of movements (urban, students, anti-corruption,
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Although that had been restricted from time to time, generally people can gather collectively. Only
in those cases in which government would like to oppress, the freedom of association is rather
confined. Nonetheless, it is not comparable to the cases in Nazi Germany.
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housing etc.). Their rights in these aspects were also undergoing expansion with new
social movements rising to challenge the status quo. And during these contentions,
there was a “…loosely knit network of pressure groups, social movement
organizations, and grassroots protest groups…” forming (Lui T.-l. &., 1997, p. 105).
There was awareness that the problem of police oppression using the POO could
potentially be suffered by these groups. The YMT incident can be characterized as
just one of the groups setting themselves against this (and there may be more
instances that we don’t know of - further investigation should be done). With the
expansion of citizenship, the right to protest is a natural product. This was the right
that had been challenged in the case of YMT boat people.
However, this kind of challenge, as we have observed, was not wide-spread
afterwards. This can be explained with a multi-factored approach that includes the
absence of the re-employment of law and the opening of the political system. These
contributed to the absence of civil disobedience movements in the early and mid1980s.
If the government did not employ the law to arrest the dissenters, there were no
sure grounds to go against it. However, the absence of civil disobedience movements
in the period can also be explained by the opening of the political system, which
drew the dissenters into the institutional channels. The previously sole way, protest,
was now the supplement of institutional politics. The pressure groups had to choose
between participation through institutional channels or continuing to fight on the
streets. According to Chan, a very large part of the social movement organizations
turned to elections (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 156).
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The June 4th Incident in 1989 had inspired somebody in Hong Kong on the
possibility of illegal struggle. However, when To Kwan-hang launched his civil
disobedience movements after 1989, he did not have much support. This is due to the
political culture or the lack of favorable condition (political system was still
undergoing reform and opening). Also, other protests launched by those prominent
political elites in the council had been the other ways out for dissent on June 4th
Incident. After 1989, there was “full-power mobilization” for once, but that was
mobilized by political organizations, rather than from the bottom-up like those of the
1970s (Chan K.-m. , 2010). The political elites were still caught in the dilemma of
choosing between legislative councils and the streets. To’s case may characterize the
minority awakened by June 4th to a launch non-institutional struggle.
In the case of 2000, the launch of civil disobedience movement was first held
by members of civil societies (like the HKFS) and then later joined by the members
of political society (like legislators). The existence of civil society as a necessary
condition has not been refuted by these cases. Also, the sufficient condition,
delegitimizing effect, causes civil disobedience movements to emerge. But for why
this series of movement is relatively significant, the favorable conditions have to be
taken into consideration.
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5.3 Institutional Deficit
The institutional deficit, mostly claimed by the initiators, is in fact not a
condition that explains the emergence of civil disobedience, but a condition
favoring/justifying the act or affecting their significance. Have those cases of
significant civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong happened at times when
institutional deficits are obvious?
In the 1970s, the newly emerged pressure groups, students and grassroots
organizations organized protests to attract media coverage and then to put pressure
on government. This, as a non-institutional means, has been explained by Lui and
Chiu (1997) with the argument of the “closed political system”. The relatively
limited channels to the establishment have “forced” groups to resort to protest, in a
way unfamiliar to the kai-fong groups and the Mutual Aid Committees (Chan K.-m. ,
2010, p. 153).
The opening of the closed political system due to decolonization drew
discontent into the institutions. The 1st District Board was established in 1982. One
third of it was generated by elections (Ma, 2010, p. 23). Urban Council elections
followed in 1983. Later, in 1985, 12 seats of functional constituency were even
added into the Legislative Council. It marked the starting point of indirect elections
in the Legislative Council (Ma, 2010, p. 23). In 1991, direct election was established
in the LegCo election (Ma, 2010, p. 23).
The former skepticism of the social activists had been swept away as time
passed. The interviewees mentioned in the case of the YMT Incident both claimed
that they had been invited to join the elections and that they did plan to join (Chan
S.-h. , 2013) (Fung H.-l. , 2013). The opening of the political system had released the
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momentum for further democratization, which was oppressed in the 1970s. The other
problems had been left aside. Institutional progress was now the main thrust of
reform.
When To Kwan-hang carried out his civil disobedience movements, this
favorable condition was not that obvious. This was because, at the time, the
influence of pan-democrats in the councils was high and especially significant in
1991. In 1991, in 18 seats elected directly, 16 seats had been gained by the prodemocracy camp (UDHK: 12; MP: 2; HKADPL: 1; Independent: 1) (Li, 2000, p.
189). Also, in 1995, the pan-democrats gained 12 seats out of 14 candidates (Lo,
1997, p. 182). Lo also commented that “…clearly, the DP’s pre-1997 strategy was to
struggle for democratization through winning as many as possible of the directly
elected seats in the legislature…” (Lo, 1997, p. 182).
The strategy employed by the “pan-democrats” from 1989 to 1997 was a far
cry from the strategy employed by the students like To Kwan-hang at the time. To’s
strategy had not been supported by the majority of the pan-democrats.
More serious institutional deficit was experienced in the post-1997 era,
however, not as a minority in seats but as a constraint by constitution. Stipulated by
the Basic Law, the post-1997 system was characterized as “executive-led”, which
was “derived from the colonial era” (Zhang, 2009, p. 315). In the articles, the Basic
Law “…restrict(ed) the power of LegCo to prevent it from being the equal of the
chief executive…” and meant that “…most government polices do not need the
approval of the legislature unless they involve changing laws or appropriations…”
(Zhang, 2009, p. 316). The power to initiate a bill152 is still controlled by the

152

Basically by Article 74. Ability to pass a bill is confined by separation of vote.
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executive, and even a bill that has been passed by the LegCo needs to be signed by
the Chief Executive (Zhang, 2009, p. 316). The Basic Law has largely confined the
constitutional power of the Legislators to initiate bills.
It seems that it was harder to launch a reform through the Legislative Council
post-1997 than it was pre-1997. Before 1997, a member’s bill was an influential
weapon for legislators. This weapon was used to launch policy that was not in line
with government policy (Ma, 2010, p. 89). From 1995153 to 1997, legislators tabled
53 member’s bills and 26 of them were passed, which was 23.2 % of the total
number of bills. However, after 1997 (from 1998 to 2004), legislators tried to put up
29 member’s bills, but only 12 of them were tabled and passed, which was only 2.6
% of the total number of bills put. What’s more important is that 11 out of the 12
member’s bills passed were Private Bills, which are not related to governmental
policy (Ma, 2010, pp. 89-90). This change was the mixed result of the stipulations of
Article 74 in the Basic Law and the separation of the vote.
Under this historical context of severe institutional constraints, it is not hard to
understand why there were a lot of legislative members participating in civil
disobedience movements during 2000. They included Szeto Wah, Martin Lee, Albert
Ho, Cheung Man-kwong, Lee Cheuk-yan, Emily Lau, Lau Chin-shek and James To
Kun-sun. The vigorous participation can be explained through many factors, but the
institutional deficit faced by these legislators is certainly be one of them.
So, the institutional deficit, although not a direct factor affecting when and how
civil disobedience emerged, was an important condition that made civil disobedience
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Before 1995, this means was not prominent. In 1991, Martin Lee was the first legislator in history
to initiate a member’s bill relating to public policy (Chau, 1995).
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significant. And when this institutional deficit was felt widely, the participation was
greater.
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5.4 Stronger Constitutional Ground
Also as a favorable condition, the stronger constitutional ground can encourage
initiation and participation into civil disobedience. In the context of Hong Kong, the
establishment of the HKBORO and the Basic Law has been an encouragement to
activists on employing the means of civil disobedience (Leung K.-h. , 2013).
In the case of To Kwan-hang, he admitted that the establishment of the
HKBORO had given him more confidence to challenge the law in court (after being
arrested in a civil disobedience) (To, 2014). What’s more interesting is that at the
time he had a chance to accept “binding-over”. To Kwan-hang decided to go on and
to risk his freedom and challenge the legality of the situation (To, 2014).
So, in practice, the establishment of the favorable laws have encouraged the
activists to consider employing civil disobedience due to the lower cost. It is because
civil disobedience cannot act as a defending argument in court but there are laws
supporting their acts and protecting their freedoms. In other words, stronger legal
grounds may be provided to the dissenters. It would then act as a favorable condition,
which lessened the cost of mobilization.
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5.5 The Delegitimizing Effect
As the most direct and immediate condition affecting the emergence of civil
disobedience, the delegitimizing effect is a special condition inviting dissenters to
carry out civil disobedience. As a special way of protest highly related to morality, if
something happens to expose and denounce the moral grounds of the authorities
(legitimacy is then be harmed), civil disobedience is the means that attacks most
straightly the weak point of the authorities.
In all the cases studied, the YMT Incident, the post-1989 civil disobedience led
by To Kwan-hang, the Anti-POO demonstration in 2000 and the Citizens’ Radio all
happened immediately after a delegitimizing event. Respectively, it was the re/employment of the POO (arrest on students) for the first three cases and the
censorship on Cheng and Wong in the latter. Whatever name one calls them, the
events happening immediately before have drawn the intense focus of the civil
society and rationalized the emergence of civil disobedience movements.
The emergence of a delegitimizing effect has enhanced the moral ground of the
activists or degraded the moral ground of their opponent, government. The enhanced
moral ground of activists has not only drawn attention from the public but also asked
them to respond with their moral engagement. In this way, the non-material resource
(moral engagement) has acted as a resource for mobilization for this specific kind of
means. This is crucial to distinguish this kind of protest means from others154. This
resource has urged activists to choose civil disobedience for attaining their goal.
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In the light shed by John Rawls, the final impression of civil disobedience movement matters.
Rawls agreed that civil disobedience movement should be nonviolent, “not from the abhorrence of the
use of force in principle, but because it is a final expression of one’s case” (Rawls, 1971, p. 106). In
the same vain, civil disobedience movement leaders should present their movement nonviolently, and
at their best to avoid being labelled as striving for personal interest. If they can present their
movement in this way, more likely the participation rate will be higher. And civil disobedience
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However, for what reason the delegitimizing effect has happened, it has been
ad hoc. In the case of To Kwan-hang, the sudden reemployment of the POO was
claimed to be the result of the change of the Chinese officials heading the Xinhua
News Agency, which in turn putt pressure on the Colonial government (To, 2014). In
the case of the Anti-POO demonstration of 2000, the arrest of students was
speculated by Fung to be an “opportunistic oppression” of the students’ movement
when a bad impression of new immigrants was given to the public by the arson
(Fung K.-k. , 2013). So, whatever the reason behind the reemployment, the
reemployment itself set a sufficient condition for the emergence of civil disobedience.

movement is a process of moral education, one can imagine one without integrity or weak on moral
ground would be harder, if not impossible to ask for other’s participating in an illegal movement out
of conscience. To be remarked here, the author of this thesis is not asking the initiator of civil
disobedience movements to be a saint, but it is needed for the movements to be presented as
something originated from conscience, but not out of personal interest. And this is the reason why the
final impression of a civil disobedience movement would be attacked by their opponent as “impure”
movement (like the Occupy Central movement being linked to agenda behind like US involvement
This is exactly what the author of this thesis named as moral engagement.) For instance, the criticism,
brought by Priscilla Lau Pui-king, accuses the Occupy Central movement is for “personal aim”
sacrificing other’s interest (Lau P.-k. , 2014). This is regarded by the author of this thesis as an act
affecting the asset of movement leaders.
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5.6 Concluding Remarks
The debate on civil disobedience has always focused on the thought of the
initiators (like Gandhi’s and Martin Luther King’s). The sociopolitical conditions for
the emergence of civil disobedience movements, according to the author’s research,
have not been well systematized. The discussion in Hong Kong on that subject is
even rarer.
This study aims at answering under what conditions the special way of protest,
civil disobedience, has been employed. The author of this thesis trusts that the launch
of civil disobedience movements would be a calculated choice after weighing the
costs and benefits of various means and that the costs and benefits are affected by the
external environment or sociopolitical conditions listed above. So, the employment
of civil disobedience, shown in the cases set in Hong Kong, is a response to the
sociopolitical conditions.
CD
Max/Min
Significant* Necessary
Sufficient
Favorable
Yau Ma Tei Min
Relatively
Y
Y
Y
Boat People
Insignificant
Incident
Post-1989
Max
Insignificant Y
Y
N
civil
disobedience
movement
Civil
Max
Significant
Y
Y
Y
disobedience
movement
in 2000
Citizens’
Max
Significant
Y
Y
Y
Radio
Incident
*Measure only by the number of participant or if it is within the circle of minority
only
So, this study argues that the emergence of civil disobedience movement is a
calculated response to certain conditions. To specify, it is the existence of (quasi-)
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civil society protected by law as a necessary condition, and the delegitimizing effect
as a sufficient condition. The institutional deficit and stronger constitutional ground
are just favorable conditions affecting the significance (or the number of participants)
of the movement.
As shown in previous chapters, the first civil disobedience movement in the
history of Hong Kong (according to the author’s research) emerged with the preexistence of (quasi-) civil society (necessary condition) and responded to the
stimulus of police (sufficient condition). And, in the special context of 1980s Hong
Kong, the emergence of civil disobedience movements were discouraged by the
opening up of the political system and the sovereignty transfer. The first maximalist
civil disobedience movements were the stimulus for the June 4th incident in 1989,
however its significance was limited by the absence of favorable conditions. And
civil disobedience movements again emerged with sufficient condition, supported by
the presence of favorable condition. Later cases in the 2000s are also consistent with
the hypothesis. So, from the cases studied, the hypothesis that “if civil society exists
in Hong Kong, delegitimizing effect then leads civil disobedience movements to
emerge” has not been refuted.
As a supplement at this very end, the author of this thesis would like to have a
little discussion on the Occupy Central movement which may happen in the near
future (the author has been writing this thesis from Jan 2013 to Aug 2014). In fact,
the interest of doing this whole study was aroused by the early discussion represented
by the crucial article written by Benny Tai (Tai, 2013). And this study would like to
contribute to the discussion as a return.
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The contribution the author would like to make, is the previous civil
disobedience movements in Hong Kong all pointing to the fact that civil
disobedience movement is a response to something which the author calls it the
delegitimizing effect. This would also greatly affect the significance of the movement.
And the audience keeping a close track to the Occupy Central movement may
criticize this study that we have observed a prelude of the Occupy Central movement
on 1st July 2014. Would this refute my hypothesis? The answer is no. The author
would like to point out that the White Paper named “The Implementation of One
Country, Two Systems in HKSAR” published right before the 1st July 2014 may be a
delegitimizing effect. Obviously, this is not a conclusion drawn from scientific study.
So, this may be the limit of this study on its period covered. However, the hypothesis
will not been refuted if the Occupy Central is really going to happen in the late
August, after the Standing Committee of the National People Congress passing the
report provided by the Chief Executive of HKSAR (Tai, 2014).

131

Appendix
Table of Interviewee
Date

Name of Interviewee

2013.09.27

Leung Kwok-hung

Position/Status in the
concerned period
Veteran Social Activist;
Legco Member (2004 on);
League of Social Democrats
mem. (LSD)

Topics covered
-

-

2013.10.16

Tsang Kin-shing

Veteran Social Activist; LSD

-

2013.10.18155

Ng Ka-sin

HKFS member

-

2013.10.24

Lau San-ching

Veteran Social Activist; LSD

-

2013.11.15

Chan Shun-hing

Student

-

2013.12.13

Fung Ho-lup

Director of SOCO

-

2013.12.15156

Chan Sin-ying

HKFS member

-

2013.12.21

Fung Ka-keung

HKFS member

-

2014.01.02

Chu Kong-wai

HKFS member

-

2014.01.03

Leung Kwok-hung (2nd
Interview)

-

2014.01.16

To Kwan-hang

Veteran Social Activist;
Legco Member (2004 on);
League of Social Democrats
mem. (LSD)
HKFS member

155
156

Have not cited
Have not cited
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-

Civil disobedience
movements in
2000s;
Citizens’ Radio
Incident;
Pre-1997 civil
disobedience
movements
Citizens’ Radio
Incident
Civil disobedience
movements in
2000s
Civil disobedience
movements in
2000s
Yau Ma Tei Boat
People Incident
Yau Ma Tei Boat
People Incident
Situation in 1980s
Civil disobedience
movements in
2000s
Civil disobedience
movements in
2000s
Civil disobedience
movements in
2000s
Pre-1997 civil
disobedience
movements
Post-1989 civil
disobedience
movements
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